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Abstract
This paper contains a collection and a classification of 75 errors seen in company
valuations performed by financial analysts, investment banks and financial consultants. The
author had access to most of the valuations that are referred to in this paper when consulting
in purchases, sales and mergers of companies, and in arbitrage processes. Some valuations
are from public reports by financial analysts.
We classify the errors in six main categories:
1. Errors in the discount rate calculation and about the riskiness of the company
2. Errors when calculating or forecasting the expected cash flows
3. Errors in the calculation of the residual value
4. Inconsistencies and conceptual errors
5. Errors when interpreting the valuation
6. Organizational errors
JEL Classification: G12, G31, M21
Keywords: valuation, company valuation, valuation errors 75 COMMON AND UNCOMMON ERRORS IN COMPANY VALUATION
This paper contains detailed descriptions of 12 valuations and errors extracted from
several others. The paper starts with the 12 valuations. Section 37.13 contains the
classification of the 75 errors, providing at least one example of each. 
The most common errors are the following:
1.B.1. Using the historical industry beta, or the average of the betas of similar companies,
when it goes against common sense. 
1.B.4. Using wrong formulas to lever and unlever the beta. 
1.B.6. When valuing an acquisition, using the beta of the acquiring company. 
1.C.1. Considering that the required market risk premium is equal to the historical equity risk
premium. 
1.D.2. Using a Debt to equity ratio to calculate the WACC different from the Debt to equity
ratio resulting from the valuation. 
1.D.5. Valuing all the different businesses of a diversified company using the same WACC.
1.D.7. Using the wrong formula for the WACC when the value of debt is not equal to its book
value.
1.E.1. Discounting the tax shield using the cost of debt or the required return to unlevered
equity. 
1.F.1. Not considering the Country Risk, arguing that it is diversifiable. 
2.A.2. Considering an increase in the company’s cash position or financial investments as an
equity cash flow. 
2.A.3. Errors in the calculation of the taxes affecting the FCF. 
2.A.4. Considering that Expected Equity Cash flows are not equal to expected dividends plus
other payments to shareholders  (share repurchases…). 
2.B.1. Wrong treatment of seasonal working capital requirements. 
2.B.2. Wrong treatment of stocks that are cash equivalent. 
2.C.1. Forgetting balance sheet accounts that affect the cash flows. 
2.D. Exaggerated optimism when forecasting the cash flows. 
3.A. Inconsistent Cash flow used to calculate the residual value. 
3.D. Using arithmetic averages instead of geometric averages to assess growth. 
4.A.1. Considering the cash in the company as an equity cash flow when the company will
not distribute it. 
4.A.2. Using real cash flows and nominal discount rates, or vice versa. 
4.B.1. Using the average of multiples extracted from transactions executed over a very long
period of time. 
4.B.2. Using the average of transactions multiples that have a wide dispersion. 
4.C.2. Considering that Equity value or Enterprise Value do not satisfy the time consistency
formulas. 4.D.3. Considering  that  the  value  of  debt  is  equal  to  its  book  value,  when  the  two  are
different. 
4.D.5. Including the value of real options that have no economic meaning. 
4.D.9. Wrong concept of the optimal capital structure. 
4.D.11. Making assumptions about future sales, margins, etc. that are inconsistent with the
economic environment, industry perspectives, or competitive analysis.  
4.D.12. Considering that ROE is the return to shareholders of non-traded companies. 
5.A. Confusing Value with Price.
5.D. Assuming that a Company has equal value to all buyers. 
5.F. Considering that goodwill includes brand value and intellectual capital. 
6.B. Assigning a valuation to an investment bank and not having any involvement in it. 
The outline of the paper is as follows:
37.1. Wrong calculation of residual value and wrong treatment of cash
37.2. WACC inconsistent with evolution of Equity and Debt Values
37.3. Multiple errors of an ad hoc method
37.4. Errors in the definition of the discount rate, and in using real cash flows and nominal
discount rates
37.5. Errors using Transaction Multiples of different years and with a wide dispersion
37.6. Error of using historical betas
37.7. Valuation using multiples wrongly
37.8. Forecasting growth wrong: arithmetic vs. geometric rates
37.9. Overoptimism
37.10. Valuation of a communications technology company in an arbitration process
37.11. Valuation of Internet companies using esoteric multiples
37.12. Cost of capital in emerging countries, illiquidity premium and small caps premium
37.13. A classification of the errors
1. Errors in the discount rate calculation and about the riskiness of the company
2. Errors when calculating or forecasting expected cash flows
3. Errors in the calculation of the residual value
4. Inconsistencies and conceptual errors
5. Errors when interpreting the valuation
6. Organizational errors
Appendix 1. List of the 75 errors
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237.1. Wrong calculation of the residual value and wrong treatment of cash
This  section  reports  the  valuation  of  a  manufacturing  company  performed  by  a
financial consulting firm.
Table 37.1 shows a valuation performed by discounting expected free cash flows at
the WACC rate of 12%. Lines 1 to 5 contain the calculation of the free cash flows. NOPAT
(Net Operating Profit After Taxes) does not include interest expenses. The residual value in
2007 is calculated assuming a residual growth of 2.5%:
Residual value in 2007 = 12,699 = 1,177 x 1.025 / (0.12 – 0.025).
The enterprise value (line 9) is the sum of the present value of the free cash flows
2003-2007 (line 7) plus the present value of the terminal value (line 8). Adding cash (line 10)
and subtracting debt value (line 11), the financial consulting firm calculates the equity value
(line 12) as $6,561 millions. The valuation may sound all right, but it contains two errors.
Table 37.1. Valuation of a manufacturing company performed by a financial consulting firm
line $million 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 Net Operating Profit After Taxes 500 522 533 574 616
2 Depreciation 1,125 1,197 1,270 1,306 1,342
3 Capital expenditures –1,445 –722 –722 –361 –361
4 Investment in working capital 203 –450 –314 –399 –420
5 Free cash flow 383 547 767 1,120 1,177
6 Residual value in 2007 (WACC 12% and residual growth 2.5%) 12,699
Present value in 2002 of free cash flows (WACC = 12%)
7 2003-2007 2,704
8 Residual value in 2007 7,206
9 Total EV (Enterprise Value) 9,909
10 Plus cash 280
11 Minus debt –3,628
12 Equity value 6,561
Errors in the valuation
1. It is inconsistent to use the FCF of 2007 to calculate the residual value. The reason for
this  is  that  in  2007  the  forecasted  capital  expenditures  (361)  are  smaller  than  the
forecasted depreciation (1342). It is wrong to assume that this will continue into the future
indefinitely. As Table 37.2 shows, net fixed assets would be negative in 2010.
Table 37.2. Expected net fixed assets according to the assumptions
2002 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gross fixed assets 12,527 16,138 16,508 16,887 17,276 17,675
Cum. Depreciation 7,628 13,868 15,244 16,653 18,099 19,580
Net fixed assets 4,899 2,270 1,264 234 –823 –1,905
3The normative 2007 FCF used to calculate the residual value should be $196 million
(assuming capital expenditures equal to depreciation) or less (if we assume that the net fixed
assets also grow at 2.5%). Correcting this error in the valuation, Table 37.3 shows that the
equity value is reduced to $556 million (instead of $6,561 million).
Table 37.3. Valuation of the manufacturing company from Table 37.1 
adjusting the normative free cash flow and the residual value
Normative 2007 FCF 196
6 Residual value in 2007 2,115 = 196 x 1.025 / (0.12 - 0.025)
Present value in 2002 of free cash flows:
7 2003-2007 2,704
8 Residual value in 2007 1,200
9 Total EV (Enterprise Value) 3,904
10 Plus cash 280
11 Minus debt –3,628
12 Equity value 556
Of course, in any given year, or in various years, capital expenditures may be lower
than depreciation, but it is not consistent to consider this in the regular cash flow used to
calculate the residual value as a growing perpetuity.
2. On line 10, the valuators add the cash ($280 million) to calculate the equity value.  It is
wrong to add all the cash because:
1. The company needs some cash to continue its operations, and
2. It is not expected to distribute the cash immediately
It will be correct to add the cash only if:
– The interest received on the cash is equal to the interest paid on the debt, or
– The cash will be distributed immediately, or
– The cost of debt used to calculate the WACC is the weighted average of the cost
of debt and the interest received on the cash holdings. In this case, the debt used
to calculate the debt to equity ratio must be debt minus cash. The cash increases
must be included in the “Investments in working capital”.
The value of the excess cash (cash on top of the minimum cash needed to continue
operations) is lower than its book value if the interest received on the cash is lower than the
interest paid on the debt. The company increases its value by distributing the excess cash to
shareholders or by using the excess cash to reduce its debt, rather than keeping it. 
37.2. WACC inconsistent with the evolution of Equity and Debt Values
Table  37.4  contains  the  valuation  of  a  Broadcasting  Company,  performed  by  an
investment  bank,  discounting  the  expected  FCFs  at  the  WACC  (10%)  and  assuming  a
4constant growth of 2% after 2008. The valuation provided lines 1 to 7, and stated that the
WACC was calculated assuming a constant Ke of 13.3% (line 5) and a constant Kd of 9%
(line 6). The WACC was calculated using market values (the equity market value at the
valuation date was 1,490 million and the debt value 1,184) and the statutory corporate tax
rate of 35%. 
The valuation also included the Equity value at the end of 2002 (3,033; line 8) and
the debt value at the end of 2002 (1,184; line 10). Table 37.5 provides the main results of the
valuation. 
Errors in the valuation
1. Wrong calculation of the WACC. To calculate the WACC, we need to know the evolution
of the Equity value and of the Debt. We calculate the Equity value based on the equity
value provided for 2002. The formula that relates the equity value in one year with the
equity value in the previous year is Et = Et–1 (1+Ket) – ECFt.
To calculate the debt value, we may use the formula for the increase of debt that appears
on line 9. The increase of debt may be calculated if we know the ECF, the FCF, the
interest and the effective tax rate. With line 10, it is easy to fill line 10.
Line 11 shows the debt ratio according to the valuation, which decreases with time.
If we calculate the WACC using lines 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10, we get line 12. The calculated
WACC is higher than the WACC assumed and used by the valuator!
Another way of showing the inconsistency of the WACC is to calculate the implicit Ke in
a WACC of 10% using lines 4, 6, 8 and 10. This is shown in line 13. Ke should be much
lower than 13.3% for using a WACC of 10%.
2. It is not valid to use the capital structure of 2008 to calculate the residual value because to
calculate the present value of the FCF growing at 2% using a single rate there has to be a
constant debt to equity ratio.
Table 37.4. Valuation of a Broadcasting Company performed by an investment bank
Data provided by the investment bank in italics.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 FCF –290 –102 250 354 459 496
2 ECF 0 0 0 0 34 35
3 Interest expenses 107 142 164 157 139 112
4 Effective tax rate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.0% 35.0%
5K e 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3%
6K d 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
7 WACC used in the valuation 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
8 Equity value (E) 3,033 3,436 3,893 4,410 4,997 5,627 6,341
9 ∆D =  ECF – FCF + Int (1-T) 397 244 –86 –197 –303 –389
10 Debt value (D) 1,184 1,581 1,825 1,739 1,542 1,239 850
11 D/(D+E) 28.1% 31.5% 31.9% 28.3% 23.6% 18.0% 11.8%
512 WACC using lines 4,5,6,8,10 12.09% 11.95% 11.93% 12.08% 12.03% 11.96%
13 Implicit Ke in a WACC of 10% 10.39% 10.46% 10.47% 10.39% 10.64% 10.91%
Table 37.5.  Valuation using the wrong WACC of 10%
Present value in 2002 using a WACC of 10%
Present value in 2002 of the free cash flows 2003-2008 647




To perform a correct valuation, assuming a constant WACC from 2009 on, we must
recalculate Table 37.4. Tables 37.6 and 37.7 contain the valuation correcting the WACC. To
assume a constant WACC from 2009 on, it is necessary that the debt also increases 2% per
year (see line 9, 2009). It implies that the ECF (line 2) in 2009 is much higher than the ECF
of 2008. 
Just by correcting the error in the WACC, the equity value is reduced from 3,033 to
2,014 (a 33.6% reduction).
Table 37.6. Valuation calculating the WACC correctly
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 FCF –290 –102 250 354 459 496 505.9
2 ECF 0 0 0 0 34 35 473.2
3 Interest expenses 107 142 164 157 139 112 76.5
4 Effective tax rate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.0% 35.0% 35.0%
5 Ke 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3%
6 Kd 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
8 Equity value (E) 2,014 2,282 2,586 2,930 3,320 3,727 4,187 4,271
9 ∆D = ECF – FCF + Int (1-T) 397 244 –86 –197 –303 –389 17
10 Debt value (D) 1,184 1,581 1,825 1,739 1,542 1,239 850 867
11 D/(D+E) 37.0% 40.9% 41.4% 37.2% 31.7% 25.0% 16.9% 16.9%
12 WACC calculated with
4,5,6,8,10 11.71% 11.54% 11.52% 11.70% 11.59% 11.44% 12.04%
Table 37.7. Valuation using the corrected WACC of Table 37.6
Present value in 2002 using the WACC calculated in Table 37.6
Present value in 2002 of the free cash flows 2003-2008 588




637.3. Multiple errors of an ad hoc method
The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  valuation  of  a  south  European  Pepsi-Cola
franchise (bottling plant and distribution company) made by a financial consulting firm. “The
term ‘value of the shares’ is defined as the estimated fair purchase or sale value for a free
buyer and a free seller, both of whom are aware of all the relevant legal documents and
neither of whom is acting under any kind of duress.” 
Table 37.8 shows the company’s balance sheets and P&L, actual and as forecast by
the financial consulting firm. Table 37.9 shows the valuation of the shares at 21.6 million
Euros. This figure is obtained by first calculating the expected free cash flows (lines 1-4).
Line 5 calculates the present value of the free cash flows 1990-1994 at 17.48%, which gives
6.3 million Euros. Line 6 is the present value of the residual value calculated in lines 11-16.
From the resulting value of the firm the debt is deducted and the value of the investments is
added to arrive at the figure of 21.6 million Euros as the value of the shares.
Table 37.8. Balance sheets and P&L of BottlingSouth (million euros)
Actual Forecast
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Sales 10.52 13.38 14.88 19.40 20.97 23.33 25.96 27.79 29.90 32.32 34.79
Net income 0.89 1.50 1.69 2.15 1.49 1.35 1.83 2.27 2.82 3.65 4.22
Balance sheet 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Net fixed assets 4.04 5.02 5.87 7.46 9.88 11.63 12.31 13.04 13.84 14.70 15.60
WCR 1.17 1.81 2.25 3.34 3.95 4.68 5.19 6.11 7.18 9.05 10.69
Total assets 5.20 6.83 8.12 10.80 13.83 16.31 17.50 19.15 21.01 23.75 26.29
Financial Debt 1.28 1.60 1.54 2.40 4.13 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55
Net worth 3.92 5.24 6.58 8.40 9.70 10.76 11.95 13.60 15.46 18.20 20.74
The risk-free interest rate at the time of the valuation was 13.3% and the year-on-
year inflation rate was 6.9%. Expected inflation was 5%.
This valuation contains at least five mistakes.
Table 37.9. Valuation of the shares of BottlingSouth (million euros)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 Net income 1.83 2.27 2.82 3.65 4.22
2 + depreciation 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.23
3 – investments in fixed assets 0.93 0.98 1.03 1.08 1.13
4 = FREE CASH FLOW 1.15 1.54 2.02 2.78 3.32
5 Present value of Free cash flows at 17.48% 6.3
6 Present value of the residual value at 12.2% 19.8 = 35.3 / (1,122)5
7 Enterprise Value 26.1
8 – Financial Debt –5.6
9 + Value of financial investments 1.0
10 Equity value 21.6
7Residual value
11 Market value of Fixed assets in 1989 17.43
12 + New investments in Fixed assets in 1990-1994 5.1
13 – Loss in the value of Fixed assets in 1990-1994 –3.00
14 + Working Capital Requirements in 1994 10.7
15 = Substantial value in 1994 30.3
16 Enterprise value in 1994 35.3  = 30.3 + 3.587 x (4.22 – 30.3 x 0.0933) 
3.587 = Present value of 1 euro for 5 years, discounted at 12.2%
9.33% = Return on assets.  4.22 = expected net income in 1994
Errors: 
1. Free  cash  flow  calculation.  The  free  cash  flow  is  miscalculated  because  it  includes
interest (part of net income) and does not include the increases in WCR.  Table 37.10
shows the impact of these two corrections on the free cash flow.
Table 37.10. Corrections to the Free Cash Flow calculation of Table 37.9.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Wrong Free Cash Flow (line 4 of Table 37.9) 1.15 1.54 2.02 2.78 3.32
– Increase in Working Capital Requirements 0.51 0.92 1.06 1.87 1.64
+ Interest expenses x (1 - 35%) 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Corrected Free Cash Flow 1.18 1.16 1.50 1.45 2.22
2. The free cash flow of the years 1990-1994 is discounted at a higher rate (17.48%) than the
residual value in 1994 (12.25%).    
3. The discount rate used for the residual value in 1994 (12.25%) is lower than the risk-free
rate (13.3%).
4. The  calculation  of  the  residual  value  is  very  curious,  but  wrong.  If  we  calculate  the
residual value as a perpetuity that grows at a rate g based on the corrected free cash flow
for 1994 (2.22), we get a rate of growth of 10.5%. Obviously, this is absurd:
Residual value = 35.3 = 2.22 (1+g)/(0.1748-g).  g = 10.5%
5. Overoptimistic  net  income  and  cash  flow  forecasts.  One  way  to  see  just  how
overoptimistic they are is to compare the growth of the dividends the company actually
paid out over the period 1984-1989 with the dividend forecasts implicit in Table 37.9 (see
Table 37.11). Over the previous 5 years dividends had grown from 0.22 million to 0.3
million, whereas over the next 5 years they were projected to grow from 0.3 million to
1.68 million. And let’s not forget that this is a soft drinks company operating in a very
mature industry.
Table 37.11. Dividends paid until 1989 and implicit dividends in the projections of Table 37.9 
(million euros) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Dividends 0.22 0.18 0.35 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.64 0.62 0.96 0.91 1.68
8What happened?
The consulting firm that produced the valuation was asked to manage the sale at the
price of 21.6 million, but they replied that they only did valuations. In the end, after various
long-drawn-out negotiations, the company’s shares were eventually sold for 5 million euros.
Note that this is not such a small amount: it assumes, if the dividends are discounted at 20%,
that the 1989 dividends will grow indefinitely at 13.2%. 5 = 0.3 x 1.132 /(0.2 – 0.132).
Table  37.12  shows  the  company’s  net  income  after  the  valuation.  Note  the  big
difference between these figures and the forecasts in Table 37.8.
Table 37.12. Net income of BottlingSouth after the Valuation (million euros)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Net income 1.08 1.30 0.59 0.64 1.30 1.08 0.59 1.20
37.4. Errors in the definition of the discount rate, and in using real cash flows and
nominal discount rates
Valuation of Cereol Ukraine provided by a major European investment bank and
dated April 2001. “The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is defined as:
CMPC (WACC) = Rf + ßu (Rm – Rf),  [1]
where: Rf = risk-free rate; ßu = unlevered beta; Rm = market risk rate.”
The WACC calculated for Cereol Ukraine was 14.6% and the expected free cash
flows (in real terms, that is, excluding inflation) for Cereol Ukraine were:
(Million euros) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
FCF 3.7 14.7 11.9 –3.0 12.9 12.9 12.6 12.6 12.6
The reported enterprise value in December 2000 was 71 million euros. This result
comes from adding the present value of the 2001-2009 FCFs (45.6) discounted at 14.6% plus
the present value of the residual value calculated with the FCF of 2009 assuming no growth
(25.3).
Errors in the valuation
1. Wrong definition of WACC. In fact, [1] is not at all the definition of the WACC. This
formula is the definition of the required return to assets, also called cost of unlevered
equity (Ku). We also must interpret the term (Rm – Rf) as the expected risk premium.
The correct formula for the WACC is:
WACC = [D / (D+E)] Kd (1– T) + [E / (D+E)] Ke [2]
where: Ke = Ku + (D / E) (1-T) (Ku - Kd) [3]
Kd = Cost of debt. D = Value of debt. E = Value of equity. T = corporate effective tax rate
9This valuation used for Cereol Ukraine a “WACC” (according to the wrong definition) of
14.6%. But 14.6% was the Ku, not the WACC. 71 million euros should have been the
Value of the unlevered equity, not the enterprise value.
On December 2000, Debt for Cereol Ukraine was 33.7 million euros and the nominal cost
of debt was 6.49%.
The correct WACC for Cereol Ukraine should have been (1):
Ke = Ku + (D / E) (1-T) (Ku – Kd)= 14.6 + (33.7/48.63) (1-0.3)(14.6-6.49) = 18.53%
WACC = [D / (D+E)] Kd (1 – T) + [E / (D+E)] Ke  = 0.409 x 6.49 (1-0.30) + 0.591 x
18.53 = 12.81%
Enterprise value = E+D = PV(FCF;12.81%) = 82.33 million euros
2. Real vs. nominal cash flows and discount rates. This valuation has another error: the
FCFs  are  in  real  terms,  that  is,  excluding  inflation  (that  is  why  free  cash  flows  are
constant  from  2007-2009  and  lower  than  in  previous  years),  while  Ku  (14.6%)  is
calculated in nominal terms, that is, including inflation.
For a correct valuation the cash flows and the discount rate used must be coherent. This
means that:
– Cash flows in real terms must be discounted with real discount rates, and 
– Cash flows in nominal terms must be discounted with nominal discount rates.
The correct way is either to increase cash flows by inflation or to deduct inflation from
nominal discount rates. In fact, for real (constant) cash flows, such as the ones that this
valuation uses, we must use real WACC and real Ku:
Real WACC = (1 + Nominal WACC)/(1 + expected inflation) – 1
Real Ku = (1 + Nominal Ku)/(1 + expected inflation) – 1 
If  we  had  discounted  inflation  expectations  in  the  long  run  of  3%,  this  would  have
resulted in a Real Ku of 11.26%.
On December 2000, Debt for Cereol Ukraine was 33.7 million euros and the nominal cost
of debt was 6.49%. Therefore, the real cost of debt was 3.39%.
Performing a consistent valuation of the real free cash flows, using real discount rates, we
get:
Ke = Ku + (D / E) (1 – T) (Ku – Kd) = 11.26 + (33.7/72.81) (1 – 0.3)(11.26 – 3.39) = 13.8%
WACC = [D / (D + E)] Kd (1 – T) + [E / (D + E)] Ke = 0.3164 x 3.39  (1 – 0.30) + 0.6836
x 13.8 = 10.19%
Enterprise value = E + D = PV(FCF;10.19%) = 106.51 million euros
Thus,  using  the  same  assumptions  as  the  Investment  Bank,  but  correcting  the  two
manifest errors, the enterprise value was 106.51 million euros instead of 71 (plus 50%).
10
(1) Remember that the (D/E) ratios must be calculated using the values obtained in the valuation.37.5. Errors using Transaction Multiples of different years and with a wide dispersion
An investment bank did this valuation in January 2003. “Table 37.13 shows the
multiples of recent transactions. We use the median of these multiples (6.8), as the median
eliminates extremes.”
Table 37.13. Transaction multiples in the oil business
Acquirer/Target Date EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT
Bunge/Cereol November 2002 6.3x 9.6x
Cargill/Cerestar October 2001 12.1x na
Land O’Lakes/Purina Mills June 2001 4.0x 8.2x
Primor Inversiones/Mavesa January 2001 7.5x 10.3x
Corn Product International/Arcancia CPC October 1998 7.3x na




1. Multiples of different years. The multiples come from a very long period of time: from
February 1995 to November 2002.
2. Dispersion of the multiples. The EV/EBITDA ranges between 4 and 12.1. Why should
6.8 (the median) be a reasonable multiple?
37.6. Error of using historical betas
The following report comes from a financial consulting firm: 
“The purpose of our study has been to make a professional estimate of the fair
value at 31 December 2001 of the shares of INMOSEV, an unlisted real estate
firm whose main business consists of buying land and building houses for resale.
We have assumed a capital contribution by a third party in the amount of 30
million euros in the year 2002, with an estimated return on its investment of
20%; that is, 6 million euros.
“Our study is based essentially on information provided to us by INMOSEV,
consisting of historical data and on assumptions and hypotheses about estimated
future income over the next 11 years (2002-2012).”
11Table 37.14. Main magnitudes of the INMOSEV valuation
Equity cash flow (ECF) ßu Ku ßL Ke Present value of ECF
2001 0 0.27 6.22% 0
2002 –30,000 0.27 6.22% 0.45 7.04% –28,026
2003 0 0.27 6.22% 0.42 6.91% 0
2004 0 0.27 6.22% 0.5 7.26% 0
2005 0 0.27 6.22% 0.52 7.35% 0
2006 0 0.27 6.22% 0.53 7.37% 0
2007 0 0.27 6.22% 0.57 7.55% 0
2008 5,631 0.27 6.22% 0.59 7.67% 3,437
2009 6,401 0.27 6.22% 0.56 7.54% 3,633
2010 7,184 0.27 6.22% 0.54 7.43% 3,796
2011 7,963 0.27 6.22% 0.52 7.32% 3,920
2012 20,501 0.27 6.22% 0.49 7.23% 9,412
Present value of cash flows from 2013 onward152,913
Sum149,085
From this total we must deduct the margin that the new shareholder who contributes the 30 million
euros will earn on the deal (we estimate a figure of around 6 million).
“Table 37.14 shows the equity cash flows that have been used in this study. The main
assumptions and estimates made in applying the valuation method mentioned above are
as follows:
Growth rate of the equity cash flows from 2012 = 1%.
Discount rate. The cost of equity corresponds to the return on long-term risk-free assets,   
plus the market risk premium, multiplied by a coefficient called beta:
Return on Spanish 15-year government bonds (risk-free return) = 5.00%
Market risk premium = 4.50% (Source: BNP Paribas, SCH)
Unlevered beta (ßu) = 0.27. Average of the unlevered betas of listed companies in Spain 
(see Table 37.15)
Levered beta  (ßL) according to INMOSEV’s (average) capital structure = 0.50
The average cost of equity is 7.25%.
Consequently, the value of INMOSEV’s shares at 31 December 2001 is on the order
of approximately 143.09 million euros.”
Table 37.15. Betas of listed real estate firms in Spain
Vallehermoso Colonial Metrovacesa Bami Urbis average
Levered beta 0.49 0.12 0.38 0.67 0.42 0.42
Unlevered beta 0.29 0.11 0.27 0.39 0.28 0.27
Source: Average of the unlevered betas, provided by SCH, of the real estate companies Vallehermoso,
Colonial, Metrovacesa, Bami and Urbis.
Error
Arbitrary  use  of  betas  from  a  regression  of  historical  data.  The  resulting  beta
(unlevered beta = 0.27) is so small that it makes no sense to use it to value any company, let
alone an unlisted one. Also, these betas (and any others that might have been used) are
12arbitrary,  as  Table  37.16  shows.  If  we  calculate  the  betas  of  the  five  companies  on  31
December 2001 using daily and monthly data and different periods, we can obtain average
unlevered betas ranging anywhere from 0.22 to 0.85. Obviously, having a valuation depend
on such a shifting and unreliable variable is contrary to all common sense and prudence.
37.16. Betas calculated at 31 December 2001, with respect to the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index,
using daily and monthly data for different periods prior to 31/12/2001
Beta at 31/12/2001
Period Data Vallehermoso Colonial Metrovacesa Bami Urbis Average
Daily 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.58 0.60
5 years Monthly 0.71 0.45 1.25 1.00 0.85
Daily 0.67 0.41 0.63 0.59 0.58
4 years Monthly 0.58 0.43 0.95 0.80 0.69
Daily 0.60 0.31 0.51 0.48 0.48
3 years Monthly 0.41 0.17 0.59 0.42 0.40
Daily 0.42 0.15 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.26
2 years Monthly 0.68 0.28 0.50 0.85 0.67 0.60
Daily 0.37 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.24
1 year Monthly 0.59 0.41 0.46 0.32 0.78 0.51
Daily 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.25 0.22
6 months Monthly 0.81 0.72 0.68 0.39 0.80 0.68
Maximum 0.81 0.72 0.68 1.25 1.00 0.85
Minimum 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.22
In the end, the shares were sold for 70.4 million euros (instead of 143 million).
This is the figure obtained by discounting the flows shown in Table 37.14 at 9.8% (rather
than at 7.26%).
37.7. Valuation using multiples wrongly
Table  37.17  shows  a  valuation  performed  by  a  well-recognized  investment  bank
using the Price-earnings ratio. The valuation has a major error. 
Table 37.17. Valuation using the Price-earnings ratio
1 Expected net income of next year 28.6 $ millions
Valuation using PER Minimum Maximum
2 PER assumed 9.0 10.0
3 PER x net income 257.4 286.0
4 Plus: excess cash 93.1 93.1
5 Minus: Financial debt  115.6 115.6
6 Minus: Retirement commitments 34.5 34.5
7 Equity value 200.4 229.0
Error. The Price-earnings ratio is equal to Equity value divided by net income. It is
not  correct  to  substract  the  debt  (line  5).  The  correct  equity  value  (according  to  the
assumptions) should be 115.6 millions higher than line 7.
To add the excess cash (line 4) is correct in this case because the buyer planned to
distribute the excess cash to the shareholders immediately.
1337.8. Forecasting the growth wrongly: arithmetic vs. geometric rates
Table  37.18  shows  the  past  evolution  of  the  EBITDA  of  an  industrial  company
operating in a mature industry. The investment bank that performed the valuation used Table
37.18 as the justification of a forecasted average annual increase of EBITDA of 6%. It is
obvious that the geometric average is a much better indicator of the past average growth.
Table 37.18. Arithmetic vs. geometric growth
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EBITDA 127 132 149 91 150 132 146 147
Annual growth 3.9% 12.9% –38.9% 64.8% –12.0% 10.6% 0.7%
Arithmetic average 1995-2002 6.0%
Geometric average 1995-2002 2.1%
37.9. Overoptimism 
The share price on July 12, 2001 was $49. The following lines are extracted from a
Valuation report about Enron Corp. produced by a recognized investment bank on July 12,
2001.
“We view Enron as one of the best companies in the economy. There are still several
misconceptions about Enron that mask the company’s strong fundamentals. We therefore
hosted an investor conference call on June 27 to clarify Enron’s growth prospects and
answer investors’ questions.
“We expect Enron shares to rebound sharply in the coming months. We believe that
Enron shares have found their lows and will recover significantly as investor confidence
in  the  company  returns  and  as  misconceptions  about  Enron  dissipate.  We  strongly
reiterate our Buy rating on the stock with a $68 price target over the next 12 months.
“Enron is a world-class company, in our view.  We  view  Enron  as  one  of  the  best
companies in the economy, let alone among our group of diversified natural gas companies.
We are confident in the company’s ability to grow earnings 25% annually for the next five
to ten years, despite its already large base. We believe that Enron investors have the unique
opportunity to invest in a high growth company with improving fundamentals.
“Valuation.  Enron  stock  is  trading  at  21.8x  our  $2.25  2002  EPS  estimate.  The
universe of more than $20-billion market capitalization companies in the S&P 500 with
greater than 20% forecast long-term growth trades at an average 1.4X PEG ratio. In this
list of 25 companies, very few trade at less than 1X PEG, while Enron trades at 0.9X. We
have established a 12-month price target of $68, representing 40% appreciation, based on
a 1.2X PEG ratio. Our 25% long-term earnings growth rate is significantly higher than the
16% (First Call) and 17% (Baseline) growth estimates. We believe that this difference
represents the opportunity in the shares as our forecasts become more generally embraced
by investors. Our sum-of-parts analysis further reinforces our $68 valuation. Based on our
DCF  analysis,  we  value  Enron  Energy  Services  at  $15  per  share.  We  have  placed  a
conservative 28.5X and 13X 2002 P/E multiple on the high growth wholesale business
and the pipeline/PG&E businesses, respectively, to arrive at a combined (including EES
and assuming zero value from communications) $68 price target. We strongly reiterate
our Buy rating on the stock with a $68 price target over the next 12 months.
14Enron earning model, 1994-2005E. US$ millions except per-share data
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001E 2002E 2003E 2004E 2005E
Net income 438 504 568 88 686 827 896 1,563 1,939 2,536 3,348 4,376
Adjusted EPS 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.87 1.00 1.18 1.47 1.85 2.25 2.75 3.52 4.47
Dividends per share 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Book value per share 5.15 5.65 6.64 9.27 9.95 12.28 13.94 15.47 17.99 21.02 24.79 29.47
“Financials.  We  recently  raised  our  2001  EPS  estimate  $0.05  to  $1.85  and
established  a  well-above  consensus  2002  estimate  of  $2.25.  We  are  confident  in  the
company’s ability to grow earnings 25% annually for the next five to ten years, despite its
already large base.”
Figure 37.1 shows the well-known evolution of the share price of Enron.
Figure 37.1 Share price, earnings per share and volume of Enron
37.10. Valuation of a communications technology company in an arbitration process
Luis Cuadrado, owner of Telecosin, S.A. (a telecommunications and information
systems company), sold 5% of his company’s shares on 20 October 1998 to Company AAA
for 36,000 euros. He also sold an option to purchase 44% of Telecosin’s share capital for
535,000 euros. AAA paid 18,000 euros for the option. AAA could exercise the option at any
time between ten business days after the signing of the agreement and 31 December 2000.
Both sales were set in the context of an industrial agreement between AAA and
Telecosin in which the two companies undertook to “make every effort to develop to the
maximum the marketing and manufacturing of complementary products for their systems,
through full cooperation in the use of the necessary technological and human resources”. The
agreement contained a number of covenants and concluded with the provision that “non-
15performance by either partner of the above-stated covenants shall entail the obligation to pay
compensation in the amount of 2.4 million euros to the remaining shareholders”.
The parties to the agreement formally accepted that “any litigation, dispute, question
or claim arising out of the execution or interpretation of this agreement shall be resolved by
the binding decision of the Court of Arbitration of (a Spanish city)”. They also agreed that
“in  the  event  that  the  option  is  exercised  by  AAA  within  the  prescribed  term  and  Mr.
Cuadrado fails to fulfill his obligation to sell said shares, Mr. Cuadrado shall return to AAA
the  amount  paid  as  the  price  of  the  option  (18,000  euros),  without  prejudice  to  any
complementary claims for compensation that may arise”.
Table 37.19 shows the balance sheets and P&L of Telecosin.
Table 37.19.  Balance sheets and P&L of Telecosin, 1995-2000 (Thousand euros)
(Thousand euros) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sales 336 768 1,009 1,848 2,746 6,815
Net income 15 8 11 98 156 87
Dividends 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash and banks 33 13 53 426 421 82
Accounts receivable 119 201 211 635 779 3,372
Inventories 0 73 20 42 150 141
Net fixed assets 59 53 50 158 235 804
Total assets 212 340 334 1,261 1,586 4,400
Short-term financial debt 0 0 2 2 0 1,124
Trade creditors 100 233 102 212 204 1,619
Other creditors 47 36 146 340 558 798
Long-term bank debt 0 0 0 405 367 314
Shareholders’ equity 64 72 83 301 457 545
Total liabilities 212 340 334 1,261 1,586 4,400
Employees at 31 December 11 15 21 41 51 101
In  September  2000,  AAA  announced  its  wish  to  exercise  the  option,  but  Luis
Cuadrado refused to sell, alleging that AAA had not met its obligations under the industrial
agreement of which the option was a part, and that, furthermore, AAA had been dissolved
(2). In October 2000, AAA took its case to the Court of Arbitration. The following section
gives a summary of the valuation that AAA submitted to the court.
37.10.1. Valuation of Telecosin submitted by AAA
“The  legitimacy  of  the  comparable  transactions  method  is  based  on  the  fact  that
financial analysts working for merchant banks, consulting firms and financial companies
for valuing companies like Telecosin widely and predominantly use this method and the
revenue parameter.
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(2) The General Meeting of 29-6-99 passed a resolution enacting the dissolution of AAA, SA., “which is
hereby dissolved without liquidation, by means of the transfer of all of its assets to 3 beneficiary companies,
one already in existence, SIIP Consulting SL., and two newly created, whose names shall be SAAP SL., and
AAA, S.A.”“In  September  last  year  a  group  of  investors  consisting  of  Dresdner  Kleinwort
Benson, MCH and Sibec acquired 20% of the company IP Sistemas for 3.6 million euros.
This implies that 100% of the company was valued at 18 million euros.
“IP Sistemas has many features in common with Telecosin, making it a suitable point
of  comparison  for  determining  the  value  of  Telecosin.  There  are,  however,  two
differences in Telecosin’s favour that need to be mentioned: long experience in the market
(which implies more consolidated goodwill and greater recognition by customers), and a
significantly  larger  workforce.  The  following  table  offers  a  comparison  of  the  two
companies:
IP SISTEMAS Telecosin
Turnover 99 0.9 million euros (1 month) 2.75 million euros
Turnover 2000 10.4 million euros 6.81 million euros
Workforce 63 people 110 people
Founded in 1999 1994
“In 1999 IP Sistemas had a turnover of 0.9 million euros. However, the company had
only started trading in November. If we extrapolate this turnover to the year as a whole, we
get an annual turnover of 5.4 million. Therefore, the growth in IP Sistemas’s turnover in
the period 1999-2000 is 90%, lower than that of Telecosin in the same period (146%) (3).
“The IP Sistemas investors valued the company with reference to the sales figure for
the current year (2000), using a sales multiple of 1.7. If this same multiple (1.7) is applied
to Telecosin’s minimum forecasted sales for 2001 (16.8 million euros), the value of the
company is 28.6 million.
“There  are  two  listed  international  companies  whose  business  activities  are  very
similar to those of Telecosin: CMG and Lógica. The capitalization-to-sales ratios of these
firms  hover  around  an  average  of  6.  However,  following  established  practice  in  the
investment community, when valuing unlisted companies we apply a discount of 30% to
the  parameters  of  listed  companies  in  recognition  of  the  value  attributable  to  share
liquidity. If we apply this discount to Telecosin, we obtain an historical sales multiple of
4.2, which, when multiplied by 6.8 million, gives us a figure very close to the valuation
obtained by comparison with the proven value of IP Sistemas (28.6 million).
“We  consider  that  the  price  at  which  a  third-party  buyer,  in  good  faith  and  with
sufficient access to relevant information about the company, would be willing to pay for
an ownership interest in the share capital of Telecosin would be 28.6 million (price based
on 100% of the company’s capital).
“It is our opinion that 44% of Telecosin’s capital is worth at least 12.6 million euros.
We consider that any professional financial firm, given the collaboration of the Telecosin
management team, could sell an interest of this kind without any difficulty to one of the
many venture capital firms interested in this industry or to a foreign company in the
industry.”
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(3) What do readers think of this comparison?Decision of the Court of Arbitration
“Establishing with any certainty the price of Telecosin at a date already in the past
and in an environment in which there have been considerable changes is a difficult and
delicate task. It is impossible to arrive at a precise figure; the best to be hoped for is an
approximation. Nevertheless, this Court is obliged to make a decision on this point.
“AAA presented a valuation based on what is known as the comparable transactions
method. Some securities firms and investment banks used this method for a period of
approximately two years (between 1998 and 2000). There was a clear reason for using it:
it was impossible to explain the exorbitant prices paid for many new economy firms using
the methods in general use up until then. The comparable transactions method never had
any theoretical underpinnings. And certainly, after the summer or autumn of 2000 it was
totally discredited. This method is therefore not worth considering.
“We are left, therefore, with the discounted cash flow method, which is the most
widely  accepted  method  of  firm  valuation,  and  the  one  that  the  Panel  of  Arbitrators
considers most appropriate in this case.
“The valuator serving as expert witness in this case accepts that cash flow discounting
is the most appropriate method. To calculate the value of Telecosin he has selected four
cash flow scenarios and has applied to each one a discount rate (Ke) of 9% and a growth
rate of cash flows from 2007 of 4%.
“Determining  future  flows  is  always  a  one-time  estimate  subject  to  significant
variations. For that reason, the most widely accepted view is that it is not sufficient to
give just one such estimate of these future flows. Instead, a range of different scenarios
must  be  considered,  each  with  a  different  cash  flow  stream  depending  on  different
hypotheses regarding the growth of the business and changes in its environment. Each of
these scenarios, and thus also each future cash flow stream, is assigned a probability. The
value is the weighted average of the whole set of scenarios.
“Consequently, the valuator has re-examined the probabilities of each scenario and
has produced the following valuation of Telecosin in million euros:
Scenario Value of shares (E) Probability (p) E x p
Optimistic 5.84 20% 1.17
Average 2.46 40% 0.99
Pessimistic 0.97 25% 0.24
Catastrophic 0 15% 0.00
Final valuation 2.40
“44% of this value equals 1.05 million euros. As the exercise price of the call option
agreed  by  the  parties  is  0.535  million  euros,  the  difference  is  the  amount  due  in
compensation.  Consequently,  Mr.  Cuadrado  must  pay  to  AAA  compensation  in  the
amount  of  0.515  million  euros.  Besides  the  above-mentioned  compensation,  Mr.
Cuadrado must return to AAA the price of the premium paid for the call option in the
amount of 18,000 euros.
“With  respect  to  the  request  for  a  rescission  of  the  agreement  whereby  AAA
purchased from Mr. Cuadrado 5% of the shares of Telecosin for a price of 36,000 euros,
18the Panel of Arbitrators understands that it is right that the agreement be rescinded, but
that the rescission is justified not by non-performance on the part of the sellers but by the
fact that the purpose of the agreement has been frustrated, a fact attributable not to said
sellers but to Mr. Luis Cuadrado. For that reason, the Panel considers it fair and equitable
that the agreement be rescinded, whereupon, on the one hand, the shares shall be returned
to their original owner and, on the other, the price paid for said shares shall be repaid, plus
any legal interest accrued from the date on which the payment was originally made to the
date on which the repayment is made effective.
“The costs of these arbitration proceedings is 93,400 euros plus VAT (arbitrators’ fees
and expenses: 81,000 euros plus VAT; court expenses: 12,300 euros plus VAT). As there
is no evidence of reckless or unscrupulous behavior on the part of either party, the costs of
this arbitration, consisting of the arbitrators’ fees and the court fees, shall be borne by the
parties in equal measure.”
37.11. Valuation of Internet companies using esoteric multiples
This  section  summarizes  the  valuation  of  Terra’s  shares  performed  by  a
Euroamerican bank in April 2000, when Terra’s share price was 73.8 euros. As the valuation
given by Table 37.21 is 104 euros per share, the bank advised its customers to buy Terra
shares.
Table 37.21. Valuation of Terra performed by a Euroamerican bank on 7 April 2000
Price Million  Capitalization  EV
per share ($) shares ($ million) Net debt (enterprise value)
AOL 65.0 2,282 148,315 –1,472 146,843
Yahoo! 158.0 526 83,184 –1,208 81,976
Lycos 61,5 110 6,760 –618 6,142
Excite@Home 30,0 352 10,559 302 10,861
Go Networks 19,0 165 3,133 349 3,482
NBC Interactive 38,5 32 1,223 259 1,482
About.com65,0 17 1,075 –176 899
The Go2Net 71,4 31 2,182 214 2,396
Ask Jeeves 59,0 35 2,062 –166 1,896
LookSmart 38,0 88 3,340 –97 3,243
Juno 13,8 39 531 –89 442
Infospace 65,5 217 14,186 –89 14,097
GoTo.com43,0 49 2,107 –104 2,003
Earthink 18,0 138 2,489 –206 2,283
TheGlobe.com5,0 30 152 –52 100
Sum of the 15 largest information
hubs in USA 281,298 –3,153 278,145
No. inhabitants (million) 273
EV per capita (US$) 1,019
GNP per capita in the US (US$) 32,328
19GNP  GNP   Adjusted EV Million Terra market
per capita  per capita per capita  inhabitants share (%) Value
(US$) vs. USA (%) (US$)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Spain  17,207 53% 542 39 30% 6,345
Hispanic America 16,164 50% 509 30 5% 764
Latin America 7,513 23% 237 338 25% 20,008
Average 9,080 28% 286 407 23%
Value of Terra ($ million) 27,117
Net debt ($ million) –525
Implicit capitalization ($ million) 27,642
Million shares: 280 Dollar/euro exchange rate: 0.94875 Price per share (euros) 104
The  valuation  is  based  on  the  15  largest  Internet  companies  in  USA.  The  first
column gives the price per share, the second column the number of shares outstanding, and
the third column the companies’ capitalization in million dollars. When the net debt is added
to  the  capitalization,  what  the  bank  calls  enterprise  value  (EV)  is  obtained,  that  is,  the
company’s value. Thus, the sum of the enterprise values of the 15 largest Internet companies
in  USA  was  278.145  billion  dollars.  The  Euroamerican  bank’s  analyst  then  divided  this
quantity  by  the  number  of  inhabitants  in  USA,  which  he  estimated  to  be  273  million,
obtaining the EV per capita in USA: 1,019 dollars.
At the bottom of Table 37.21, the analyst divided Terra’s market into 3 geographical
areas: Spain, Hispanic America (American citizens who are Spanish speakers) and Latin
America.  Column  [1]  shows  the  gross  national  product  per  capita  in  each  of  the  three
geographical areas, and column [2] shows the percentage they represent with respect to the
gross national product per capita in USA ($32,328). Column [3] is the result obtained by
multiplying the EV per capita in USA (1,019 dollars) by the ratio between the gross national
product per capita in each of the three geographical areas and the North American gross
national product per capita (column [2]). He then multiplied column [3] by the number of
inhabitants in each geographical area (column [4]) and by Terra’s estimated market share in
each of these markets (column [5]), and obtained Terra’s value in each of these geographical
areas (column [6]). Adding the 3 amounts in column [6], he arrived at the value for Terra:
27.117 billion dollars. After subtracting the net debt from this amount, he obtained Terra’s
implicit capitalization: 27.642 billion dollars. By dividing this quantity by the number of
Terra shares (280 million) and by the euro’s exchange rate, the analyst obtained the value
of the Terra share: 104 euros per share.
Doesn’t this valuation seem surprising to the reader? We can propose another way
of getting the figure of 104 dollars per share: The value of the Terra share is twice the age of
Manolo Gómez’s mother-in-law, who is 52. We chose Manolo because he lives near Terra’s
corporate headquarters. Of course, this valuation is absurd, but it has the same rigor as that
given in Table 37.21. As the saying goes, “the blind man dreamt he saw and he dreamt what
he wanted to see” (4). 
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(4) Other valuations of Internet companies using esoteric multiples may be seen in Fernández (2002), chapter 12.Figure 37.2. Market price of the shares of Terra
37.12. Cost of capital in emerging countries, illiquidity premium and small caps premium 
We  present  the  real  cost  of  the  unlevered  equity  (Ku)  in  US$  for  an  edible  oil
company operating in Ukraine as of March 31, 2001 calculated by three different investment
banks. The Ku is calculated in real terms in US$ because the expected FCF were expressed
also in real US$. The real Ku provided by the three investment banks was quite different:
15.72%, 12.2% and 10.92%. The impact on the valuation is big and may be seen in the
following table:
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Recurring g
FCF (real US$ million) 7.7 17.7 14.5 –23.3 2.6 27.6 29 32 32 2%
Ku in real US$ 15.72% 12.20% 10.92%
Value of unlevered equity (Vu) as of March 31, 2001 (US$ million) 127.9 190.3 226.4
37.12.1. “The Ukrainian country risk premium has been adjusted to neutralize the political
risk,  which  is  covered  by  the  insurance  policy  (5).  Usually  in  the  country  risk
premium, political risk accounts for 50%. The specific risk premium accounts for
the fact that the strong competitive advantage will be challenged in the medium
term, although this effect cannot be modeled within the cash flow projections.”
Ukraine Source
US nominal risk-free rate 5.50% 30-year US bonds
US long-term inflation rate 3.00% World Bank
US real risk-free rate (RF) 2.50% A
Country risk premium  13.50% Bloomberg (Sovereign bonds premium)
Adjusted country risk premium (Crs) 6.75% B
Adjusted risk-free rate 9.4% C = (1 + A)(1 + B)-1
Unlevered equity beta (ßu) 0.34 D Bloomberg
US equity market risk premium 5.00% E Ibbotson
US small size equity premium 2.60% F Ibbotson
Specific premium 2.00% G
Unlevered cost of equity 15.72% C + D x E + F + G
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(5) The company had an insurance policy with cover of $50 million.37.12.2. “The  unlevered  cost  of  capital  is  an  estimation  of  equity  investors’  return
expectations considering the operational risk of the Company only and is calculated
as follows:
Ku = RF + Crs + ßu x [(Rm - RF) + Lr]
“The real risk-free rate for Ukraine is derived from the U.S. risk-free rate of 4.59% (yield
of the 10-year U.S. treasury bond) less a 2.5% inflation correction (source: U.S. Treasury) as
business plan figures are expressed in real terms rate (RF = 4.59% – 2.5% = 2.09%). A
Ukrainian country risk spread (Crs) of 7.5%, based on the country rating of B– (source: S&P,
Fitch IBCA and Thomson), is added. RF + Crs = 9.59%.
“The equity risk premium (Rm – RF) retained corresponds to the European historical
risk premium of 5% shown in the Millenium Book (source: ABN Amro and London
Business School).
“The  liquidity  risk  premium  (Lr)  is  the  additional  premium  observed  for  small
companies, which are usually considered riskier. We use the average illiquidity discount
for small caps from Détroyat Associés from January to March 2001 (3.42%). 
“The unlevered beta has been calculated as the average of the following sample:
Diversified Oil Seed Companies Equity Beta Market Net Tax Unlevered
(Bloomberg) cap. debt rate Beta
Archer Daniels Midland 0,50 7664 3933 35% 0.37
Aarhus Oliefabrik A/S 0,47 920 1461 36% 0.23
Koipe SA 0,25 350 –133 35% 0.33
Average 0,41 0.31
Ku = 4.59% – 2.5% + 7.5%  + 0.31 x [5% + 3.42%] = 12.2% in March 2001.”
37.12.3. “To calculate the cost of equity in real terms in US$ we have used the following
parameters prevalent in the markets at the time of the valuation (March 2001):
A. U.S. Risk-Free Rate: 5.5% (30-year U.S. government bonds)
B. Expected U.S. Inflation Rate: 3.0% (IMF forecast)
C. Country risk premium: 6.5% (see below)
D. U.S. Equity premium: 4.0% (market average)
E. Beta for operations (unlevered): 0.48 (average of the betas from a sample of
individual firms)
“As a measure of the systematic risk of the operations (unlevered beta) we
have used the estimated average of the unlevered beta for firms operating in the
food-processing industries. This beta is calculated as the average of the unlevered
beta from a sample of individual firms computed from a five-year sample using
monthly  returns.  This  is  an  appropriate  measure  of  systematic  risk  given  that
investors  in  Ukraineoil  have  access  to  world  equity  markets.  The  estimated
unlevered beta is 0.48.
22“Calculation of the Risk Premium for Ukraine:
We  have  the  following  quantitative  information  for  the  calculation  of  the  risk
premium in the Ukraine on March 2001:
Spread on EBRD loan  5.0%
Spread on Ukraine Sovereign Bonds 13.5%
“Fitted” Spread on Ukraine Sovereign Bonds 7.5%
“These three indicators suggest that the market spread on Ukraine sovereign bonds
in  March  2001  was  also  unusually  high  and  that  a  more  stable  risk  premium  should  be
calculated from the spread on the EBRD loan and the fitted spread. We will also use the fitted
spread on Ukraine sovereign bonds in March 2001, i.e. 7.5%, as the measure of Ukraine’s
country risk premium (again note that this is a conservative estimate since by June 2002 it
had already dropped to 4.5%).
“Cost of Equity in real terms in US.$ = A – B+ C + E x D  = 5.5% – 3% + 6.5% – 0.48 x 4% = 10.92%”
37.12.4. Differences among the three unlevered cost of equity calculations
Table 37.22 contains the different parameters used by the three valuators. The final
calculation of Ku is done with the formulas used in the first valuation. Note that if the Ku
calculation were performed with the formulae of the first valuation, the values for the second
and third valuations would have been 14.72% and 11.08%, instead of 12.2% and 10.92%.
Table 37.22. Unlevered cost of equity if calculated according to the procedure of 37.12.1
line 37.12.1 37.12.2 37.12.3
1 US nominal risk-free rate 5.50% 4.59% 5.50%
2 US long-term inflation rate 3.00% 2.50% 3.00%
3 US real risk-free rate (RF) 2.50% 2.09% 2.50% A
4 Country risk premium  13.50% 7.50% 7.50%
5 Adjustment factor 0.5 1.0 0.867
6 Adjusted country risk premium (Crs) 6.75% 7.50% 6.50% B
7 Adjusted risk-free rate 9.42% 9.75% 9.16% C = (1+A)(1+B) – 1
8 Unlevered equity beta (ßu) 0.34 0.31 0.48 D
9 US equity market risk premium 5.00% 5.00% 4.00% E
10 Small size equity premium 2.60% 3.42% 0.00% F
11 Specific premium 2.00% 0.00% 0.00% G

































































































































































DateThe main differences among the three calculations of Ku are:
1. Line 1. The nominal risk-free rate. The first and third valuation use the yield on 30-year
US Gov. Bonds, while the second valuation uses the yield on the 10-year US Gov. Bonds.
2. Line 2. US long-term inflation rate. The first and third valuation use 3% as expected
inflation, while the second valuation uses 2.5%.
3. Line 4. Country risk premium. The first valuation uses 13.5%, the second and the third 7.5%.
4. Line 5. Adjustment factor. The first and third valuations adjust the country risk premium
due to the insurance policy. The second valuation does not adjust.
5. Line 7. The first valuation uses formula (37.12.1), while the second and third use formula
(37.12.2).
Adjusted risk-free rate = (1 + US real risk-free rate) (1 + Adjusted country risk premium) –1
(37.12.1)
Adjusted risk-free rate = US real risk-free rate + Adjusted country risk premium (37.12.1)
6. Line 8. Unlevered equity beta (ßu). Each of the three valuations uses a different one.
7. Line 9. US equity market risk premium. The first and the second use 5%, the second 4%.
8. Line 10. Small size equity premium. The first and second valuations consider a small size
premium, while the third does not. An additional difference between the first valuator and
the second is the way they add the small size equity premium: the first adds it, while the
second multiplies the small size equity premium by the beta.
9. Line 11. Specific premium. The first valuator considers a specific premium; the second
and the third do not.
37.12.5. Our judgment of the three calculations
First of all, let’s look at the manifest errors.
1. Specific premium. The first valuator uses a specific risk premium of 2%, arguing that “the
strong competitive advantage will be challenged in the medium term, although this effect
cannot be modeled within the cash flow projections”. Obviously this is wrong. If “the
strong  competitive  advantage  will  be  challenged  in  the  medium  term”,  it  should  be
reflected in lower projections of volumes and margins. But it has nothing to do with the
riskiness of the cash flows of 2002.
2. Small size equity premium. The second valuator introduces what he calls “The liquidity
risk premium (Lr)”, but defines it as a small size equity premium (“is the additional
premium  observed  for  small  companies,  which  are  usually  considered  riskier”).  He
considers the average illiquidity discount for small caps from Détroyat Associés from
January to March 2001 (3.42%). In the current case such a risk does not exist since there
is a “willing buyer and a willing seller” and, according to the shareholders agreement,
“the Fair Market Value of the Shares corresponds to 49% of the Fair Market Value of
the Company.” Even if a size/liquidity premium was appropriate, the 3.42% used by the
second valuator is inappropriate for the following reasons:
1. The size premium is highly unstable, varies over time and is not always present (6).
Therefore, the size premium to use for valuation should be a long-run premium, not
a short-run premium. They use a 3-month premium, which is clearly inappropriate.
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(6) Knetz and Ready (1997) show that the often mentioned size discount in U.S. stock markets disappears if 16
out of 396 months for the 1963-1990 period are deleted. 2. The company is not a small firm in the context of the Ukraine economy, so the
size premium for that market should not apply.
3. The size premium reported in the literature is much smaller than 3.42% or even
positive. For instance, for the French market (the one used) the size premium
between 1986 and 1998 was estimated to be on average 0.44%, with a maximum
during this period of 1.64% (7). Figure 37.3 shows the evolution of the S&P 500
(large caps) and of the S&P 600 (small caps) (8) in the period 1973-2003. It is
clear that the return of the small caps index (S&P 600) was smaller than the
return of the large caps index. If the return differential (2.28% annual) was a
good approximation for the small size premium, then the small size premium
should be negative (–2.28%).
Figure 37.3. Evolution of the S&P 500 (large caps) and of the S&P 600 (small caps) 
in the period 1973-2003
Also, Wang (2000) reports that “previous studies find that small stocks have higher
average  returns  than  large  stocks,  and  the  difference  between  the  returns  cannot  be
accounted for by the systematic risk, beta. In my analysis of Compustat and CRSP data
from 1976 to 1995, and simulation experiments based on the data, I find the size effect
can be largely explained by data truncation that is caused by survival. I conclude that the
size effect is largely a spurious statistical inference resulting from survival bias, not an
asset pricing anomaly.”
3. Illiquidity  premium.  Damodaran  (2001,  page  245)  notices  that  “the  estimation  of
illiquidity discounts seems arbitrary, with discounts of 25% to 30% being most commonly
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(7) J. Hamon and B. Jacquillat (1999), “Is there Value-added information in Liquidity and Risk Premiums?”
European Financial Management.
(8) The S&P Small Cap 600 was launched in October, 1994.  It provides a representative sample of the small-
cap population, with an emphasis on institutional investability.  It includes a selection of stocks across a
variety of economic sectors and industry groups. The Small Cap 600 does not include IPOs, which are
sometimes  hot,  sometimes  not  and  often  illiquid.  It  also  does  not  include  REITs,  which  are  generally
viewed  as  real  estate  investments.  The  Small  Cap  600  is  gaining  wide  acceptance  as  the  preferred
benchmark  for  both  active  and  passive  management  due  to  its  low  turnover  and  greater  liquidity.
Approximately $8 billion is indexed to the S&P SmallCap 600.of the Asset due to the fact that the seller cannot find a buyer willing to pay that Fair
Market Value” (9). In the current case such a risk does not exist since there is a “willing
buyer and a willing seller” and according to the shareholders agreement  “the Fair Market
Value of the Shares corresponds to 49% of the Fair Market Value of the Company”.
4. Market Risk Premium. The second valuator uses a risk premium of 5% based on the
“average European historical risk premium”. The source of the data used by the second
valuator clearly states that this historical number is an upward bias and should not be used
as a predictor of a future risk premium. The authors of the work cited by the second
valuator conclude in their analysis that “a set of forward-looking, geometric mean risk-
premia for the United States, United Kingdom and for the world all falling within the
range of around 2.5 and 4 percent, and a corresponding set of arithmetic mean risk premia
falling in a range of around 3.5 to 5.25 percent” (10). Therefore, the number used by the
second  valuator  is  clearly  too  large  and  a  number  of  4  percent  is  a  more  realistic
conservative estimate.
5. Country Risk Premium. The appropriate country risk premium should be a measure of the
risk premium required by investors participating in equity markets in Ukraine. 
For the calculation of this country risk premium in emerging markets one possibility
is  to  look  at  the  differential  between  the  long-term  sovereign  bonds  of  the  emerging
market denominated in dollars and the U.S. government bonds of the same maturity. This
is a broad measure of the default risk involved in the sovereign debt of that country
relative to what is perceived to be the risk-free rate (i.e. the U.S. government bond).
Despite the widespread use of this measure of country risk premium, it is a very rough
approximation, highly criticized in the literature, and a measure that, if taken at face
value, might lead to very erroneous conclusions. Therefore, its use should be thoroughly
reasoned.  The  main  reasons  why  this  measure  can  be  a  bad  estimate  of  market  risk
premium for corporate valuation are:
1. Government Default: It is a measure of the probability of default on government
securities and not on corporate securities. This measure may not be appropriate for
the  valuation  of  corporate  operations  in  countries  that,  when  they  defaulted  in
government  securities,  this  default  did  not  imply  the  default  of  corporate  and
private debt in the country. This was the case in Russia in 1998. In fact, recent
examples of sovereign defaults, such as the Russian example, has led the leading
rating agencies to abandon their long-run policy that sovereign debt ratings were a
ceiling  for  the  ratings  of  corporates  from  those  countries  (see  Moody’s,  2001).
These  rating  agencies  currently  explicitly  acknowledge  the  possibility  that
corporate  ratings  could  be  higher  than  their  corresponding  sovereign  ratings  in
situations in which the sovereign rating is under stress. 
2. Preferred Creditor: Sovereign country risk, computed as the spread on government
securities, is not appropriate for private corporations that are capable of accessing
world  debt  markets  on  much  better  terms  than  their  respective  sovereign
governments (see Standard & Poors (2001) and Durbin and Ng (1999)).  
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(9) Pennam (2001) argues: “The risk of having to trade at a price that is different from intrinsic value because
of a scarcity of traders is called liquidity risk” (p. 706).
(10) Dimoson, E., P. March and M. Staunton (2002) “Global Evidence on the Equity Risk Premium”, Journal
of Applied Corporate Finance, September.3. Market Liquidity: The corporate bond market is a far deeper market, in terms of the
number of participants, than the country bond market, and thus less volatile on a
period-by-period  basis  (see  Damodaran,  2000).  This  lack  of  liquidity  in  the
sovereign market results in periods in which corporate bonds offer significantly
lower yields than sovereign bonds (Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001)).
4. Diversification:  Some  authors  even  argue  that  to  the  extent  that  country  risk  is
diversifiable in world markets, there should be no country risk at all.
All of these arguments are relevant for the valuation of the Ukrainian company on
March 2001.  More specifically:
1. Government Default: Ukraine had experienced defaults in its government securities
just prior to March 2001. However, those defaults did not imply the default of
corporate obligations from Ukrainian corporations. As mentioned above, exactly
this experience has led the leading rating agencies to revise their rating policies to
explicitly allow for situations in which corporate investments have lower risk than
their sovereign counterparts. Therefore, the risk premium that should apply to the
Ukrainian company should reflect this fact.
2. Preferred Creditor: The company has access to international debt markets at a much
better rate than the number suggested by the sovereign spreads. The company had
arranged  a  line  of  credit  from  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and
Development (EBRD) and was paying, in March 2001, a rate of LIBOR + 5%.
This loan suggests a default risk premium on the order of 5%.
3. Market Liquidity:  Ukraine  had  recently  defaulted  in  the  sovereign  bonds.  This
situation had drastically decreased the liquidity of its sovereign debt instruments. In
March 2001, both Ukraine and Russia had just rescheduled their debt obligations
and started to renew their payments to debtors. Despite these improvements in their
situation,  the  sovereign  spreads  in  March  2001  were  unreasonably  high  for  the
corresponding country ratings of Russia and Ukraine by Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s. It is a historical pattern that a stable long-run relationship exists between
country ratings by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and the size of the sovereign
spread. The “fitted” spread from this stable relationship is commonly used as the
appropriate measure of country risk, since it is less subject to specific short-run
situations  of  the  country  and  more  reflective  of  the  long-run  perspective.  For
instance, this is the measure that BNP Paribas uses for computing country risk in
emerging markets (see Bancel and Perrotin). Given the rating of Ukraine in March
2001 (S&P initial coverage rating of B- in Dec. 2001, Moody’s had a Caa1 rating),
the spread according to this long-run relationship should have been of 7.5% and
5.5%. This effect has since been confirmed by the fact that the ratings of both of
these countries have consistently improved. The current rating for the Ukraine from
Moody’s is B1. This improvement has been confirmed, with spreads for Ukrainian
sovereign debt consistently dropping over the last year to a value, in June 2002, of
5.22%.
4. Diversification: The business of the company is the marketing and distribution in
the CIS of all of its products. This is a region with a large potential for economic
development.  The  company  could  potentially  diversify  its  activities  into  other
countries in the region if the market situation were to worsen. The company also
has an insurance policy for its operations in Ukraine that partially covers the risk
associated with operations in that country. 
275. Insurance policy. Ukraineoil holds an insurance policy that covers a substantial part
of the political risk involved in its Ukraine operations. This policy reduces the risk
of operating in the country and should be reflected in the country risk premium. The
policy  provides  an  insured  value  of  $50  million.  There  is  no  direct  way  of
measuring the impact of this policy on the risk premium. It is difficult to determine
the proportion of the risk premium that reflects political risk and the percentage of
the total value of the asset that the insured value of $50 million represents. To be
conservative, we have assumed that the policy does not decrease the country risk
premium. This is clearly a very conservative position. 
How to calculate the cost of equity is far from clear. There is no consensus in the
finance literature. Lessard (1996) proposes to multiply the industry beta (with respect to
the  world  market)  by  the  country  beta.  Godfrey  and  Espinosa  (1996)  add  the  spread
between the yield of an emerging market government bond denominated in dollars and
the yield of a comparable US bond, to the risk-free rate (see that it is equivalent to use the
yield of an emerging market government bond denominated in dollars as the risk-free
rate). In addition, the beta they use is 60% of the ratio between the volatility of the
company and the volatility of the world market. Estrada (2000) proposes using a beta
equal to the ratio of the downside volatility of the company and the downside volatility of
the world market. The definition of downside volatility (σd) is: 
σd = ( (1/T) ∑ Min[0, (Rit – B)]2 )1/2 
Rit is the return of company i in period t, and B is the desired benchmark.
Estrada (2000) also proposes the downside beta (dß) as another variation. Damodaran
(2001, page 68) proposes calculating the country risk premium by multiplying the spread
between the yield of an emerging market government bond denominated in dollars and
the  yield  of  a  comparable  US  bond  (Crs)  by  “an  additional  equity  risk  premium  by
measuring how much more volatile is the Ukrainian equity market than its bond market.”
The country risk premium for Ukraine, according to Damodaran, should be calculated as
follows: Crs x (σEQUITY UKRAINE / σGOV. BONDS UKRAINE).
We already have seven formulae to calculate the required return to unlevered equity
of Ukrainoil in real terms:
[1] 37.12.1: Ku = [(1+RF )(1+ Crs) – 1] + ßu x RPUSA + Lr + Sp
[2] 37.12.2: Ku = RF + Crs + ßu x (RPUSA + Lr]
[3] 37.12.3: Ku = RF + Crs + ßu x RPUSA
[4] Lessard (1996): Ku = RF + (ßu x ßUKRAINE) x RPWORLD
[5] Godfrey and Espinosa (1996): Ku = RF + Crs + [0.6 x (σUKRAINEOIL/σWORLD)] x RPWORLD
[6] Estrada (2000): Ku = RF + (σdUKRAINEOIL / σdWORLD) x RPWORLD
[7] Estrada (2000): Ku = RF + dßUKRAINEOIL x RPWORLD
[8] Damodaran (2001): Ku = RF + Crs x (σEQUITY UKRAINE / σGOV. BONDS UKRAINE) +
ßu x RPUSA
RF = US real risk-free rate 
Crs = spread between the yield of a Ukrainian government bond denominated in dollars
and the yield of a comparable US bond
ßu = unlevered industry beta
RP = expected market risk premium
Lr = liquidity risk
Sp = Specific premium
28σd = downside volatility
dß = downside beta
Only [1] considers specific premium. Only [1] and [2] consider liquidity risk
37.14. A classification of the errors
In this section, we provide a classification of 78 errors, grouped under the following
six headings:
– Errors in the discount rate calculation and about the riskiness of the company 
– Errors when calculating or forecasting the expected cash flows 
– Errors in the calculation of the residual value 
– Inconsistencies and conceptual errors 
– Errors when interpreting the valuation
– Organizational errors 
We provide an example of each error.
1. Errors in the discount rate calculation and about the riskiness of the company
1.A. Wrong risk-free rate used for the valuation
1.A.1. Using the historical average of the risk-free rate as the actual risk-free rate. Taken
from  a  financial  consultant:  “The  best  estimate  of  the  risk-free  rate  to  use  in  the
CAPM is the historical average of the US risk-free rate from 1928 until today”.
This is patently absurd. Any student who used an average historical rate from 1928 to
2001 in a university examination (not to mention in an MBA) would be failed on the
spot. The risk-free rate is by definition the rate that can be obtained now (at the time
when Ke is calculated) by buying (risk-free) government bonds now. It is obvious that
expectations and forecasts have little to do with the past, or with an average historical
rate.
1.A.2. Using  the  short-term  government  bond  rate  as  the  meaningful  risk-free  rate  in  a
valuation. Taken from a financial consultant: “The best estimate of the risk-free rate to
use in the CAPM is the return of 90-day US Treasury Bills”.
The correct way to calculate a company’s cost of capital is to use the rate (Yield or
IRR) of long-term government bonds (using bonds of a duration similar to that of the
expected cash flows) at the time of calculating Ke.
1.B. Wrong beta used for the valuation 
1.B.1. Using the historical industry beta, or the average of the betas of similar companies,
when the result goes against common sense. An example is the error in section 37.6.
1.B.2. Using the historical beta of the company when the result goes against common sense.
Historical betas change dramatically, as shown in Campa and Fernández (2003). They
29calculate betas of 3,813 companies each day of December 2001 and January 2002,
using  60  monthly  returns,  and  report  that  a  company’s  maximum  beta  was,  on
average, 15.7 times its minimum beta. The median of the maximum beta divided by
the minimum beta was 3.07. The median of the percentage daily change (in absolute
value) of the betas was 20%, and the median of the percentage (in absolute value) of
the betas was 43%. Table 37.16 of this paper and Damodaran (2001, page 72) also
show that the calculated betas change dramatically and that they depend very much on
the period used to estimate the beta.
1.B.3. Assuming  that  the  beta  calculated  from  historical  data  captures  the  country  risk.
Interpretation of the beta of a foreign company listed on the stock market in the USA.
Taken from an investment bank: “The question is: Does the beta calculated on the
basis of the company’s share price in New York capture the different premiums for
each risk? Our answer is yes, because just as the beta captures changes in the economy
and the effect of leverage, it must necessarily absorb the country risk.”
There  are  various  ways  of  including  a  company’s  country  risk  component  in  the
CAPM formula. The most common is to use the spread between the long-term dollar
treasury bonds of the country in which the firm operates and long-term U.S. Treasury
bonds.
1.B.4. Using wrong formulae to lever and unlever the beta. Fernández (2002, page 506)
shows six different formulae for levering and unlevering the beta. Only one of them is
correct, as shown in Fernández (2003a): the correct relationship between the levered
beta (ßL) and the unlevered beta (ßu) is: ßL = ßu + (ßu – ßd) D (1 – T) / E.
The other wrong relationships are:
Damodaran (1994): ßL = ßu + ßu  D (1 – T) / E 
Practitioners: ßL = ßu + ßu  D / E 
Harris-Pringle (1985), Ruback (1995 and 2002): ßL = ßu + (ßu – ßd) D / E. 
Myers (1974): ßL = ßu + (ßu – ßd) (D – VTS) / E. 
Miles-Ezzell (1980): ßL = ßu + (ßu – ßd) (D / E) [1 – T Kd / (1+Kd)] 
1.B.5. Arguing that the best estimation of the beta of an emerging market company is the
company’s beta with respect to the S&P 500. “The best way to estimate the beta of an
emerging economy company with a U.S. stock market listing is to regress the return of
the share on the return of a U.S. stock market index.”
No, because it is well known (we have plenty of data to confirm this) that companies
that  are  rarely  traded  have  absurdly  low  calculated  betas.  Scholes  and  Williams
(1977), for example, warned of this problem and suggested a method for partly getting
over it.
There  is  also  the  problem  of  the  instability  of  betas  that  have  been  estimated  by
regression: they are very unstable and depend very much on the data used to calculate
them.
Simply using a share’s historical beta without analyzing the share and the company’s
future prospects is very risky, as historical betas are unstable and depend, in almost all
companies, on what data we use (daily, weekly, monthly...).
301.B.6. When  valuing  an  acquisition,  using  the  beta  of  the  acquiring  company.  From  an
analyst’s report: “As the Target Company is much smaller than the bidder, the Target
Company  will  have  almost  no  influence  on  the  resulting  capital  structure  and  the
riskiness  of  the  resulting  company.  Therefore,  the  relevant  beta  and  the  relevant
capital structure for the valuation of the Target Company are those of the acquiring
company.” Wrong, the relevant risk is the risk of the acquired assets. If this was not
the case, a Government bond should have different value for every company.
1.C. Wrong market risk premium used for the valuation
1.C.1. The required market risk premium is equal to the historical equity risk premium. Table
37.1.1  shows  that  the  US  historical  equity  risk  premium  changes  considerably
depending on the time period used for calculating it. Figures 37.1.1 and 37.1.2 also
prove that. The required market risk premium (the one used in valuation to determine
the required return to equity) is an expectation and has little to do with history.
Table 37.1.1. Historical equity risk premium in the US
Average Annual Returns of Equity Risk Premium
Arithmetic Average Stocks T.Bills T.Bonds Stocks - T.Bills Stocks - T.Bonds
1928-1953 9.46% 1.03% 2.96% 8.44% 6.51%
1928-1999 12.68% 3.92% 5.05% 8.76% 7.63%
1928-2002 11.60% 3.93% 5.35% 7.67% 6.25%
1962-2002 11.19% 6.03% 7.53% 5.17% 3.66%
1992-2002 10.73% 4.40% 8.58% 6.32% 2.15%
Average Annual Returns of Risk Premium
Geometric Average Stocks T.Bills T.Bonds Stocks - T.Bills Stocks - T.Bonds
1928-1953 6.49% 1.02% 2.92% 5.47% 3.57%
1928-1999 10.76% 3.87% 4.79% 6.89% 5.96%
1928-2002 9.62% 3.89% 5.09% 5.73% 4.53%
1962-2002 9.90% 5.99% 7.14% 3.90% 2.76%
1992-2002 9.09% 4.40% 8.14% 4.69% 0.95%
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from 1928 to the indicated yearTable 37.1.2. Historical equity premium in the US from the indicated year until December 2002
1.C.2. The required market risk premium is equal to zero. This argument typically follows
the arguments of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Mehra (2003), who say that “stocks
and bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios,
and hence, they should command approximately the same rate of return.” Siegel (1998
and 1999) interprets Table 37.1.1. by saying: “although it may seem that stocks have
more  risk  than  long-term  Treasury  bonds,  this  is  not  true.  The  safest  long-term
investment (from the viewpoint of preserving the investor’s purchasing power) has
been stocks, not Treasury bonds.”
1.D. Wrong calculation of WACC
1.D.1. Wrong definition of WACC. An example is error 1 in section 37.4.
1.D.2. The Debt to equity ratio used to calculate the WACC is different from the Debt to
equity ratio resulting from the valuation. An example is error 1 in section 37.2. (Use
of book values, do not iterate…)
1.D.3. Using discount rates lower than the risk-free rate. An example is error 3 in section
37.3. Ke and Ku are always higher than the risk-free rate. WACC may be lower than
the risk-free rate only for investments with extremely low risk. An example of that
may be found in Ruback (1986) (11). 
1.D.4. Using the statutory tax rate instead of the effective tax rate of the levered company.
There are many valuations in which the tax rate used to calculate the WACC is the
statutory tax rate (normally arguing that the correct tax rate is the marginal tax rate).
However, this is wrong. The correct tax rate to use for calculating the WACC for
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(11) Ruback, Richard S. (1986), “Calculating the Market Value of Risk-Free Cash Flows”, Journal of Financial
Economics (March), pp. 323-339.1.D.5. Valuing all the different businesses of a diversified company using the same WACC
(same leverage and same Ke).
1.D.6. Considering that WACC / (1 – T) is a reasonable return for the stakeholders of the
company. Some countries assume that a reasonable return for the assets of a telephone
company is WACC/(1 – T). Obviously this is not correct. It could be valid only for
non-growing perpetuities and if the return on assets was calculated before taxes.
1.D.7. Using a wrong formula for the WACC when the value of debt (D) is not equal to its
book value (N). Fernández (2002, page 416) shows that the expression for the WACC
when the value of debt (D) is not equal to its book value (N) is WACC = (E Ke + D
Kd – N r T) / (E + D). Kd is the required return to debt and r is the cost of debt.
1.E. Wrong calculation of the value of tax shields
1.E.1. Discounting the tax shield using the cost of debt or the required return to unlevered
equity. Many valuators assume, following Ruback (1995 and 2002), that the Value of
tax  shields  (VTS)  is  the  present  value  of  tax  shields  (D  Kd  T)  discounted  at  the
required return to unlevered equity (Ku).  There are also many valuators that assume,
following Damodaran (1994), that the Value of tax shields (VTS) is the present value
of tax shields discounted at the cost of debt (Kd). Fernández (2003a) proves that both
expressions are incorrect and that the value of tax shields is the present value of D Ku
T discounted at the required return to unlevered equity (Ku): VTS = PV[D Ku T; Ku]
1.E.2. Odd or ad-hoc formulae. Fernández (2002, page 506) shows different expressions for
calculating the value of tax shields that are frequently used and that are supported by
some papers in the financial literature. But Fernández (2003a) proves that the value of
tax  shields  is  the  present  value  of  D  Ku  T  discounted  at  the  required  return  to
unlevered equity (Ku): VTS = PV[D Ku T; Ku].
Some wrong formulae to calculate the value of tax shields are:
Harris-Pringle (1985) and Ruback (1995 and 2002): PV[Ku; D T Kd ]
Myers (1974): PV[Kd; D T Kd ]
Damodaran (1994): PV[Ku; DTKu - D (Kd – RF) (1 – T)]
Practitioners: PV[Ku; DTKd  – D(Kd- RF)]
Miles-Ezzell (1980): PV[Ku; D T Kd] (1 + Ku)/ (1 + Kd)
1.F. Wrong treatment of country risk
1.F.1. Not taking Country Risk into account, arguing that it is diversifiable. Taken from a
regulator: “It is not correct to include the country risk of an emerging country because
from the perspective of global investors only systematic risk matters, and country
specific  events  will  be  uncorrelated  with  global  market  movements.  Therefore,
country  specific  events  will  be  unsystematic  risk,  totally  uncorrelated  with  global
market movements.” According to this, the required return to equity will be equal for
a US diversified portfolio and for a Bolivian diversified portfolio.
1.F.2. Assuming that a disaster in an emerging market will increase the calculated beta, in
relation  to  the  S&P  500,  of  the  country’s  companies.  Taken  from  a  financial
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convertibility,  capital  transfer  controls,  threats  to  democratic  stability)  that
significantly raises the country risk will lead automatically to a substantial increase in
the estimated beta, in relation to the S&P500, of the companies that operate in that
country.”
No. That is why, when valuing companies in emerging countries, we use the country
risk,  because  the  beta  no  longer  captures  all  of  the  above-mentioned  risks:
devaluation,  end  of  convertibility,  capital  transfer  controls,  threats  to  democratic
stability...
Also, if ADRs have low liquidity (if they are traded only a few times each day and are
unlikely to be traded exactly at the close of each session, which is when analysts
usually take prices for calculating betas), then the calculated beta will tend towards
zero, owing to the non-synchronous trading effect, which is perfectly described by
Scholes and Williams (1977).
1.F.3. Assuming that an agreement with a government agency eliminates country risk. Taken
from  an  investment  bank:  “If  a  government  grants  a  company  a  monopoly  of  a
particular market, with agreements that guarantee legal and tax stability and economic
equilibrium, then there is no country risk (such as devaluation, end of convertibility,
capital transfer controls, threats to democratic stability).”
No. The risks of devaluation, end of convertibility, capital transfer controls, threats to
democratic stability, etc. remain. No government can eliminate its own risk. That is
to say, the shares of a company that operates in a country cannot have less risk than
the government bonds of that country. A Company’s shares would have exactly the
same  risk  as  the  country’s  government  bonds  only  if  the  government  were  to
guarantee and fix future dividends for shareholders. However, that does not usually
happen.
1.F.4. Assuming that the beta provided by Market Guide with the Bloomberg adjustment
incorporates the illiquidity risk and the small cap premium. Taken from an investment
bank:  “The  Market  Guide  beta  captures  the  distorting  effects  of  the  share’s  low
liquidity and the small size of the firm through the so-called Bloomberg adjustment
formula.”
No. The so-called “Bloomberg adjustment formula” is simply an arbitrary adjustment
to make the calculated betas converge towards 1. The arbitrary adjustment consists of
multiplying the calculated beta by 0.67 and adding 0.33. Adj. Beta = 0.67 * raw beta +
0.33. It must be stressed that this adjustment is completely arbitrary. 
1.G. Including an illiquidity, small-cap, or specific premium when it is not appropriate. 
Examples are errors 1 and 2 in section 37.12.
2. Errors when calculating or forecasting the expected cash flows
2.A. Wrong definition of the cash flows
2.A.1. Forgetting the increase in Working Capital requirements when calculating Cash Flows.
An example is error 1 in section 37.3.
342.A.2. Considering an increase in the company’s cash position or financial investments as an
equity cash flow. An example is error 2 in section 37.1; and another is in Damodaran
(2001, page 211), where the author argues that “when valuing a firm, you should add
the value of cash balances and near-cash investments to the value of operating assets”.
In  several  Internet  company  valuations,  analysts  calculate  the  present  values  of
expected cash flows and add the cash of the company, even when it is well known that
the company will not distribute it in the foreseeable future.
2.A.3. Errors in the calculation of the taxes that affect the FCF. Using the taxes paid (in $
amount) by the levered company. Some valuators use the statutory tax rate or a tax
rate different to the tax rate of the levered company for calculating the FCF. Fernández
(2002, page 501) claims that the correct tax rate that should be used to calculate the
FCF is the tax rate of the levered company.
2.A.4. Expected Equity Cash flows are not equal to expected dividends plus other payments
to shareholders (share repurchases…). There are several valuation reports in which the
valuator computes the present value of positive Equity Cash Flows in years when the
company will not distribute anything to shareholders. Also, Stowe, Robinson, Pinto,
and  McLeavey  (2002)  say  that  “Generally,  Equity  Cash  Flow  and  dividends  will
differ. Equity Cash Flow recognizes value as the cash flow available to stockholders
even if it is not paid out.” Obviously this is not correct, unless we assume that the
amounts not paid out are reinvested and get a return equal to Ke (the required return to
equity). 
2.A.5. Considering net income as a cash flow. Fernández (2002, page 178) points out that net
income is equal to the equity cash flow only in a no-growth perpetuity (constant P&L
and constant Balance sheet company).
2.A.6. Considering net income plus depreciation as a cash flow. Taken from a valuation
performed by an institution: “The sum of the net income plus depreciation is the rent
(cash flow) generated by the company.” Then, the valuator concluded that the equity
value was the net present value of this “rent”.
2.B. Errors when valuing seasonal companies
2.B.1. Wrong treatment of seasonal working capital requirements. Fernández (2003b) shows
that the equity value calculated using annual data without making the adjustments
understates the true value by 45% if the valuation is done at the end of December, and
overstates the true value by 38% if the valuation is done at the end of November. The
error  of  adjusting  only  by  using  average  debt  and  average  working  capital
requirements ranges from –17.9% to 8.5%.
2.B.2. Wrong treatment of inventories that are cash equivalent. Fernández (2003b) shows
that when the inventories are a liquid commodity such as grain or seeds, it is not
correct to consider all of them as working capital requirements. The excess inventories
financed with debt are equivalent to a set of futures contracts: not taking this into
account undervalues the company.
2.B.3. Wrong treatment of seasonal debt. Fernández (2003b) shows that the equity value
calculated  using  annual  data  without  making  the  adjustments  understates  the  true
value by 45% if the valuation is done at the end of December, and overstates the
true value by 38% if the valuation is done at the end of November. The error of
35adjusting only by using average debt and average working capital requirements ranges
from –17.9% to 8.5%.
2.C. Errors due to not projecting the balance sheets
2.C.1. Forgetting balance sheet accounts that affect the cash flows. In a balance sheet, 
WCR + NFA = D + Ebv. 
It also holds that 
∆WCR + ∆NFA = ∆D + ∆Ebv.
There are many valuations that are wrong because the valuator did not project the
balance sheets and the increase of assets (∆WCR + ∆NFA, which appear in the cash
flow  calculation)  does  not  match  the  assumed  increase  of  debt  plus  the  assumed
increase of the book value of equity.
2.C.2. Considering  an  asset  revaluation  as  a  cash  flow.  In  countries  with  high  inflation,
companies are permitted to revaluate their fixed assets (and their net worth). But this
is only an accounting appreciation and not a cash outflow (although the fixed assets
increase) nor a cash inflow (although the net worth increases).
2.C.3. Interest payments are not equal to debt times cost of debt. In several valuations, this
simple relationship did not hold.
2.D. Exaggerated optimism when forecasting the cash flows
Two examples are error 5 in section 37.3 and the Enron valuation in section 37.9.
3. Errors in the calculation of the residual value
3.A. Inconsistent Cash flow used to calculate the value of a perpetuity. An example is error
1 in section 37.1.
3.B. Debt to equity ratio used to calculate the WACC to discount the perpetuity is different
to the Debt to equity ratio resulting from the valuation. An example is error 2 in
section 37.2.
3.C. Using ad hoc formulas without any economic meaning. An example is error 4 in
section 37.2.
3.D. Using arithmetic averages instead of geometric averages to assess the growth. An
example is the error in section 37.8.
3.E. Calculating the residual value using a wrong formula. When the residual value is
calculated as a growing perpetuity, the correct formula is RVt = CFt+1 / (K – g). RVt is
the residual value in year t. CFt+1 is the cash flow of the following year. K is the
appropriate discount rate and g is the expected growth of the cash flows. But many
valuations use the following wrong formulae:
RVt = CFt / (K – g)
RVt = CFt+1 (1+g) / (K – g)
364. Inconsistencies and conceptual errors
4.A. Conceptual errors about the free cash flow and about the equity cash flow
4.A.1. Considering the cash in the company as an equity cash flow when the company will
not distribute it. An example of this is error 2 in section 37.1.
4.A.2. Using real cash flows and nominal discount rates or viceversa. An example is error 2
in section 37.4.
4.A.3. The free cash flow and the equity cash flow do not accomplish ECF = FCF + ∆D – Int
(1-T).  This equation represents the relationship between the equity cash flow and the
free cash flow. It may be found in Fernández (2002, pages 42 and 401). There are
many valuation reports in which, given the FCF, the debt increase (∆D), the interest
payments (Int), and the effective tax rate (T), the calculated ECF bears no relation at
all  to  the  expected  equity  cash  flows  of  the  company  (dividends  plus  share
repurchases).
4.B. Errors when using multiples
4.B.1. Using the average of multiples extracted from transactions executed over a very long
period of time. An example is error 1 in section 37.5.
4.B.2. Using the average of transactions multiples that have a wide dispersion. An example is
error 2 in section 37.5.
4.B.3. Using multiples in a way that is different from their definition. An example is the error
in section 37.7.
4.B.4. Using a multiple from an extraordinary transaction. An example is the valuation in
section 37.10.1.
4.B.5. Using ad hoc valuation multiples that go against common sense. An example is the
valuation of Terra in section 37.11.
4.C. Time inconsistencies
4.C.1. Assuming that the equity value will be constant in the future. Taken from an analyst
valuation report: “as we do not know the evolution of the equity value of the company,
a good approximation is to assume that the equity value will remain constant in the
following five years.” This is not correct. Fernández (2002, pages 401 and 497) shows
that the relationship between the equity value of different years is: Et = Et-1 (1+Ket) –
ECFt. Note that the equity value is constant (Et = Et-1) only if ECFt = Et-1 Ket. It only
happens in no-growth perpetuities.
4.C.2. The  Equity  value  or  the  Enterprise  Value  do  not  accomplish  the  time  consistency
formulae.  Fernández  (2002,  pages  401)  shows  that  the  relationship  between  the
enterprise value of different years is: Et + Dt = (Et-1+Dt–1) (1+WACCt) – FCFt. 
374.D. Other conceptual errors
4.D.1. Not  considering  cash  flows  resulting  from  future  investments.  An  example  is  the
valuation of Oleina Holding, an edible oil company that was market leader in Ukraine,
with strong volume and brand recognition also in Russia. The company was almost at
full capacity and had plans to invest in a new plant in Russia.
Taken from an investment bank: “From a methodological viewpoint, if this project
had to be taken into account, its net present value should be assumed to be nil. The
most  reasonable  approach  would  be  to  assume  that  the  investment  is  expected  to
deliver a return that is equal to financial markets expectations, which implies a net
present value equal to zero.”
Taken from a professor at a business school, acting as expert witness in an arbitrage.
“By taking into account a future Russian plant project in the valuation, the seller of the
shares would benefit from the profits generated by this new project without incurring
the related risks, as he would not take part in the future investment.”
4.D.2. Considering  that  a  change  in  economic  conditions  invalidates  signed  contracts.  A
European bank bought a securities company on February 16, 2001. The European
bank bought 80% of the shares and gave the current owners a put on the remaining
20% of the shares with an exercise price of 54 million euros (equal per share price as
the transaction). The current owners tried to exercise the put in May 2002, but the
European bank refused, arguing that: “As, due to specific extraordinary circumstances,
the situation of the financial markets and of the world economy in May 2002 was very
much worse than on 16 February 2001, we have no obligation to accept the exercise of
the put at the agreed exercise price. The unforeseen recession was aggravated by the
shock of 11 September 2001, which had both short and medium-term effects, insofar
as  stock  market  behavior  over  the  following  twelve  months  was  unfavorable  and
highly volatile.” The European bank produced a new valuation of the shares of the
securities company on May 2002 that argued that the price of the shares that fallen
86.3% since February 2001.
Contracts are signed to be fulfilled. Besides, there are no grounds for the claim that
stock market volatility increased significantly after 11 September 2001. Figures 37.4.1
and 37.4.2 show the volatility of the S&P500, Nasdaq, Eurostoxx 50 and FTSE 100. It
can be seen that the increase in volatility following September 11, 2001 was short-
lived and soon dissipated. By March 2002 the volatility was similar to what it had
been before September 11. Consequently, the effect of September 11 did not cause a
permanent increase in volatility.
38Figure 37.4.1. Annual volatility of the S&P500 and of the Nasdaq.   
Calculated with daily data of the last 25 days. Period: May 2001 - May 2002. 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Figure 37.4.2. Annual volatility of the Eurostoxx 50 and of the FTSE 100.   
Calculated with daily data of the last 25 days. Period: May 2001 - May 2002. 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
The effect of September 11 on prices was also short-lived. Table 37.4.1 shows what
a short time the effect of September 11 on the S&P500, the Nasdaq and other world stock
market indexes lasted. It is quite clear that the effect of September 11 did not lead to a
permanent increase in volatility or a permanent decrease in prices. Consequently, it cannot be





















11/05/01 11/07/01 10/09/01 10/11/01 10/01/02 12/03/02
EUROSTOXX 50 FTSE 100Table 37.4.1. Effect of September 11, 2001 on four stock indexes: 
S&P 500, Nasdaq, EURO STOXX 50, and FTSE 100
S&P 500  Nasdaq  EURO  FTSE
STOXX 50 100
10/09/01 1092.5 1695.4 3440.7 5033.7
11/09/01 1092.5 1695.4 3220.3 4746.0 September 11, 2001
12/09/01 1092.5 1695.4 3260.9 4882.1
13/09/01 1092.5 1695.4 3293.8 4943.6
14/09/01 1092.5 1695.4 3091.2 4755.8
17/09/01 1038.8 1579.6 3205.0 4898.9
18/09/01 1032.7 1555.1 3189.9 4848.7
19/09/01 1016.1 1527.8 3105.1 4721.7
20/09/01 984.5 1470.9 2967.9 4556.9
21/09/01 965.8 1423.2 2877.7 4433.7 Lowest level after September 11
10/10/01 1081.0 1626.3 3468.3 5153.1 Eurostoxx higher than on September 10
11/10/01 1097.4 1701.5 3510.6 5164.9 FTSE 100 higher than on September 10
15/10/01 1090.0 1696.3 3393.6 5067.3 Nasdaq higher than on September 10
16/10/01 1097.5 1722.1 3455.3 5082.6 S&P 500 higher than on September 10
26/10/01 1104.6 1769.0 3611.9 5188.7
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
4.D.3. Considering that the value of debt is equal to its book value, when they are different.
A common assumption in valuations is to consider that the value of debt (D) is equal
to its book value (N). However, there are circumstances in which this assumption is
not reasonable. For example, when the company has long-term fixed-rate debt and
interest rates have increased (decreased), the debt value (D) is lower (higher) than its
book value (N).
4.D.4. Not using the correct formulae when the value of debt (D) is not equal to its book
value (N). Fernández (2002, page 416) shows that the expression for the WACC, when
the value of debt (D) is not equal to its book value (N) is WACC = (E Ke + D Kd – N
r T) / (E + D). Kd is the required return to debt and r is the cost of debt.
4.D.5. Including the value of real options without any economic meaning. An example: Table
37.4.2 contains the net present value calculation of a project for a new plant in Brazil
for a supplier of automotive interior systems to most of the major car assemblers.
Initial  outlays  amounted  to  nearly  $38  million.  The  project  involved  supplying
components for 500,000 cars the first year and 850,000 cars the following years. The
net present value of the project (given the cost of the new plant and the expected free
cash flows) using a WACC of 14.95% is negative: -$ 7.98 million.
Table 37.4.2. Net present value calculation of a project for a new plant in Brazil. 
WACC  = 14.95%
Salvage 
($ million) in nominal terms 0 1 2 3 4 5 value
FCF –37.9 3.5 12.6 10.7 8.5 7.1 3.8
NPV –7.98
40However, the valuator argued that the owner of the plant had additional options that
were not included in the net present value calculation:
– Options that come from the future attainment of new supply contracts during the
life of the plant (growth options, valued as three European options with strike
prices of $5.6, $0.4 and $0.085 million).
– Option to renew initial supply contracts at their expiration date (prolongation
option, valued as a European option with strike price of $42.7 million). The
salvage  value  of  the  project  is  neither  the  value  of  its  contract  renewal  nor
the liquidation price of its assets, but the maximum of both.
– Flexibility options: possibility of adapting project costs to the evolution of sales.
– Abandonment option: possibility of abandoning the investment prior to the end
of its life. (Valued as an American put option on the future cash flow stream with
strike price equal to its salvage value and maturity date the project’s life).
Valuing the options and the project, the valuator said that the expanded net present
value (value of the plant taking into consideration the real options imbedded in the
investment)  was  as  shown  in  Table  37.4.3.  The  valuator  concluded:  “Considering
the real options together displays a significant positive expanded NPV for different
assumptions about the future evolution of the state variable (number of cars that are
produced  and  assembled  in  Brazil)  and,  therefore,  validates  the  optimality  of  the
investment decision.
Table 37.4.3. Expanded net present value of a project for a new plant in Brazil, 
as a function of the drift rate and of the volatility
Drift rate
Volatility 0% 7% 15%
7% 2.4 7.5 15.2
13% 2.5 7.6 15.2
20% 2.8 7.2 13.6
Volatility  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the  number  of  cars  that  are  produced  and
assembled in Brazil.
Drift rate means the expected growth in the number of cars that are produced and
assembled in Brazil.
Questions to the reader: Do the options belong to the company? Do you think that the
specification of the options (which depend almost exclusively on the number of cars
that are produced and assembled in Brazil) is a good description of them? Would you
advise to invest in the project?
4.D.6. Forgetting to include the value of non-operating assets. Taken from a valuation report:
“We do not consider in our valuation the value of the shares that the company has in a
traded telephone company because this investment is totally unrelated to the industrial
and commercial activities of the company.” The value of the shares of a company is
the present value of the expected equity cash flows plus the current value of the non-
operating assets. 
414.D.7. Inconsistencies between discount rates and expected inflation. In a valuation report,
the  WACC  (in  nominal  terms)  used  was  5.4%  and  the  expected  inflation  used  to
forecast the free cash flows was 6%.
4.D.8. Valuing a holding company assuming permanent losses (without tax savings) in some
companies and permanent profits in others. In a valuation report, performed by an
investment bank, of a holding company that had two subsidiaries, the equity of one
subsidiary was valued at $81 million, while the equity of the other was valued at
–$33.9. The taxes of the latter were forecasted as zero because the company was
assumed to have permanent losses.
4.D.9. Wrong concept of the optimal capital structure. Taken from a valuation report: “The
optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes enterprise value (debt value plus
equity value). In the context of the Adjusted Present Value, the enterprise value is
equal to the value of the unlevered company plus the present value of tax shields.
Since the value of the unlevered company is constant and unrelated to leverage, the
optimal capital structure is one that maximizes the present value of tax shields.” More
about the optimal capital structure may be found in chapter 18 of Fernández (2002).
4.D.10.In mature companies, using projected cash flows that are much higher than historical
cash flows without any good reason.  An example is error 5 in section 37.3.
4.D.11.Making assumptions about future sales, margins, etc. that are inconsistent with the
economic  environment,  industry  outlook,  or  competitive  analysis.  Taken  from  a
financial consultant’s valuation of a platform company: “The following table presents
the two extreme scenarios of the evolution of the company’s sales.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Optimistic 2.7 3.5 4.2 5.1 6.2 7.4 9.0 10.5 12.1 13.6 15.0
Pessimistic 2.7 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.7 6.8 8.0 9.2 10.5 11.6 12.5
The expected inflation is 2%.”
4.D.12.Considering that the ROE is the return to shareholders for non-traded companies.
This  is  quite  a  common  and  very  mistaken  assumption.  If  ROE  is  a  good
approximation of the return to shareholders for non-traded companies it should be
also a good approximation for traded companies. The following table shows that the
ROE of General Electric has little to do with the return to its shareholders. 
General Electric 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 average
Shareholder return 14% 26% 1% 44% 40% 51% 42% 53% –5% –15% –37% 16%
ROE 21% 18% 18% 23% 24% 25% 25% 26% 27% 27% 26% 24%
4.D.13.Considering that the ROA is the return to debt and equityholders. Following the same
argument as in the previous point, the ROA has little to do with the return to the
shareholders. The ROA (NOPAT / (Ebv +D)) is an accounting ratio, while return is
something that refers mainly to changes in expectations.
4.D.14.Using different and inconsistent discount rates for cash flows of different years or for
different components of the Free cash flow. An example is error 2 in section 37.3.
424.D.15. Using past market returns as a proxy for required return to equity. Taken from a
valuation  performed  by  an  institution:  “The  opportunity  cost  of  investing  in  the
company could be the return of an investment in the stock exchange. As an indicator
of the return of the stock exchange, we use the S&P 500 index, but with a long time
series to eliminate the influence of short-term market movements. S&P 500 as of
June 28, 1999 = 1331.35. S&P 500 as of December 28, 2002 = 1457.66.
(1457.66 / 1331.35) – 1 = 9.5%. 
Therefore, the estimated annual cost of equity is: (1 + 9.5%)2 – 1 = 19.9%.”
4.D.16. Adding  the  liquidation  value  and  the  present  value  of  cash  flows.  Taken  from  a
valuation  performed  by  an  institution:  “The  minimum  value  of  the  shares  of  the
company is $20.1 million, the sum of the liquidation value ($9.6 million) and the
present value of expected cash flows ($10.5 million).”
4.D.17. Using ad hoc formulas to value intangibles. Taken from a valuation performed by a
financial consultant: “Valuing the intangibles is very difficult. But an approximation
could be to quantify the guarantees that the shareholders have given to the banks.
The financial debt of the company is about $20 million. We estimate that the bank
loans without the shareholders’ guarantees could have an additional annual cost of
2.5%. Quantifying this 2.5% along 10 years, the additional financial cost will be
about $2 million. Therefore, $2 million is a good approximation of the value of the
intangibles.”
4.D.18.Arguing that different discounted cash flow methods provide different valuations. All
methods always give the same value, as is shown in chapters 17 and 21 of Fernández
(2002). This result is logical, since all the methods analyze the same reality under the
same hypotheses; they only differ in the cash flows taken as starting point for the
valuation.
5. Errors when interpreting the valuation. The following errors arise from forgetting that
the value resulting from any valuation is always contingent on a set of expectations
(about the future of the company, of the industry, of the country and of the world
economy) and on the appraisal about the risk of the company.
5.A. Confusing Value with Price. The value is always contingent on a set of expectations.
A company normally will have different values for different buyers. If the price paid
in an acquisition is equal to the value for the buyer, then, the value created by the
acquisition equals zero. In contrast, do not forget that value is normally a number in an
Excel worksheet, while price is very often cash. There is a difference between $20
million cash and $20 million written in an Excel worksheet.
5.B. Asserting that “the valuation is a scientific fact, not an opinion.” A valuation has little
to do with science. A valuation is always an opinion. 
5.C. Assuming that a valuation is valid for everybody. A company normally will have a
different value for the buyer and for the seller.
5.D. Assuming that a company has equal value to all buyers. A company normally will
have different value for different buyers.
5.E. Confusing  strategic  value  for  a  buyer  with  fair  market  value.  The  strategic  value
contains the extra value (normally due to additional cash flow generation) that a given
43buyer thinks that he may get from a company on top of what might be “normal” for
other buyers.
5.F. Considering that the goodwill includes the brand value and the intellectual capital.
Goodwill is just the difference between the price paid and the book value. There are
many cases (especially when interest rates are high) in which the price paid is smaller
than the book value. An example is section 37.3: the book value of the shares was
10.76 million euros, and the shares were sold for 5 million euros. Does that mean that
the brand value of Pepsi or the value of the “intellectual capital” was negative?
5.G. Forgetting that a valuation is contingent on a set of expectations about cash flow
generation  and  about  their  riskiness.  This  is  of  particular  importance  in  some
acquisition processes. Example: a bidder’s valuation of the shares of a company was
$273 million. But there was another bidder that offered $325 million. The CEO of the
first company asked its CFO to prepare another valuation with a minimum of $350
million. The CFO increased expected sales, expected margins and expected residual
growth and got a valuation of $368 million. The CEO offered $350 million, got the
company and organized a celebration party. 
6. Organizational errors
6.A. Making a valuation without checking the forecasts given by the client. Very often,
the valuator will ask the client for a forecast of cash flows (or a P&L forecast) of the
company. And also, very often, the valuator will use this forecast (which sometimes is
a  letter  to  Santa  Claus  or  to  the  Three  Kings)  without  doing  any  check  of  its
credibility.  An  example:  A  soft  drinks  bottling  and  distribution  company  gave  an
eight-year forecast in which sales doubled every four years. However, headcount was
assumed to remain constant and there were no significant investments.
6.B. Assigning a valuation to an investment bank and not having any involvement in it. A
quite common error is to assign a valuation to an investment bank and wait for the
valuation  report.  Obviously,  any  such  valuation  is  only  the  value  of  the  company
according to the investment bank’s forecast (of the economy, of the industry and of
the company) and according to the investment bank’s appraisal of the riskiness of the
company.
6.C. Involving only the finance department in the valuation of a target company. To get a
decent valuation, it is necessary to get the sales, production, marketing, personnel,
strategy, and legal departments involved.
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List of errors
1. Errors in the discount rate calculation and about the riskiness of the company
A. Wrong risk-free rate used for the valuation
1. Using the historical average of the risk-free rate.
2. Using the short-term Government bond rate.
B. Wrong beta used for the valuation
1. Using  the  historical  industry  beta,  or  the  average  of  the  betas  of  similar
companies, when the result goes against common sense.
2. Using the historical beta of the company when the result goes against common
sense.
3. Assuming that the beta calculated from historical data captures the country risk.
4. Using wrong formulae for levering and unlevering the beta.
5. Arguing that the best estimation of the beta of a company from an emerging
market is the beta of the company with respect to the S&P 500.
6. When valuing an acquisition, using the beta of the acquiring company. 
C. Wrong market risk premium used for the valuation
1. The required market risk premium is equal to the historical equity premium.
2. The required market risk premium is equal to zero.
D. Wrong calculation of WACC
1. Wrong definition of WACC.
2. Debt to equity ratio used to calculate the WACC is different from the debt to
equity ratio resulting from the valuation.
3. Using discount rates lower than the risk-free rate.
4. Using  the  statutory  tax  rate  instead  of  the  effective  tax  rate  of  the  levered
company.
5. Valuing  all  the  different  businesses  of  a  diversified  company  using  the  same
WACC (same leverage and same Ke).
6. Considering that WACC / (1-T) is a reasonable return for the stakeholders of the
company.
7. Using a wrong formula for the WACC when the value of debt is not equal to its
book value.
E. Wrong calculation of the value of tax shields
1. Discounting  the  tax  shield  using  the  cost  of  debt  or  the  required  return  to
unlevered equity.
2. Odd or ad-hoc formulas.
F. Wrong treatment of country risk
1. Not taking the country risk into account, arguing that it is diversifiable.
2. Assuming that a disaster in an emerging market will increase the beta of the
country’s companies calculated with respect to the S&P 500.
3. Assuming  that  an  agreement  with  a  Governmental  Agency  eliminates  the
country risk.
4. Assuming  that  the  beta  provided  by  Market  Guide  with  the  Bloomberg
adjustment incorporates the illiquidity risk and the small cap premium.
G. Including an illiquidity, small-cap, or specific premium when it is not appropriate.
452. Errors when calculating or forecasting the expected cash flows
A. Wrong definition of the cash flows
1. Forgetting the increase in Working Capital Requirements when calculating Cash
Flows.
2. Considering the increase in the company’s cash position or financial investments
as an equity cash flow.
3. Errors in the calculation of the taxes that affect the FCF. 
4. Expected  Equity  Cash  flows  are  not  equal  to  expected  dividends  plus  other
payments to shareholders  (share repurchases, …).
5. Considering net income as a cash flow.
6. Considering net income plus depreciation as a cash flow.
B. Errors when valuing seasonal companies
1. Wrong treatment of seasonal working capital requirements.
2. Wrong treatment of stocks that are cash equivalent.
3. Wrong treatment of seasonal debt.
C. Errors due to not projecting the balance sheets
1. Forgetting balance sheet accounts that affect the cash flows.
2. Considering an asset revaluation as a cash flow.
3. Interest expenses not equal to D Kd.
D. Exaggerated optimism when forecasting the cash flows.
3. Errors in the calculation of the residual value
A. Inconsistent Cash Flow used to calculate a perpetuity.
B. The Debt to equity ratio used to calculate the WACC to discount the perpetuity is 
different from the Debt to equity ratio resulting from the valuation. 
C. Using ad hoc formulas without any economic meaning. 
D. Using arithmetic averages instead of geometric averages to assess growth. 
E. Calculating the residual value using a wrong formula.
4. Inconsistencies and conceptual errors
A. Conceptual errors about the free cash flow and about the equity cash flow
1. Considering the cash in the company as an equity cash flow when the company
has no plans to distribute it. 
2. Using real cash flows and nominal discount rates or viceversa. 
3. The free cash flow and the equity cash flow do not accomplish ECF = FCF + ∆D
– Int (1-T).
B. Errors when using multiples
1. Using the average of multiples extracted from transactions executed over a very
long period of time. 
2. Using the average of transactions multiples that have a wide dispersion. 
3. Using multiples in a way that is different from their definition. 
4. Using a multiple from an extraordinary transaction. 
5. Using ad hoc valuation multiples that go against common sense. 
C. Time inconsistencies
1. Assuming that the equity value will be constant over the next five years.
2. The Equity value or the Enterprise value do not accomplish the time consistency
formulas.
D. Other conceptual errors
1. Not considering cash flows resulting from future investments. 
2. Considering that a change in economic conditions invalidates signed contracts.
3. Considering  that  the  value  of  debt  is  equal  to  its  book  value  when  they  are
different. 
464. Not using the correct formulas when the value of debt is not equal to its book
value.
5. Including the value of real options without any economic meaning.
6. Forgetting to include the value of non-operating assets.
7. Inconsistencies between discount rates and expected inflation.
8. Valuing a holding company assuming permanent losses (without tax savings) in
some companies and permanent profits in others.
9. Wrong concept of the optimal capital structure.
10.In  mature  companies,  using  projected  cash  flows  that  are  much  higher  than
historical cash flows without any good reason. 
11. Making assumptions about future sales, margins, etc. that are inconsistent with
the economic environment, industry perspectives, or competitive analysis.
12.Considering that the ROE is the return to shareholders.
13.Considering that the ROA is the return to debt and equityholders.
14.Using different and inconsistent discount rates for cash flows of different years
or for different components of the Free cash flow.
15.Using past market returns as a proxy for required return to equity. 
16.Adding the liquidation value and the present value of cash flows.
17.Using ad hoc formulas to value intangibles.
18.Arguing  that  different  discounted  cash  flow  methods  provide  different
valuations.
5. Errors when interpreting the valuation
A. Confusing Value with Price.
B. Asserting that “the valuation is a scientific fact, not an opinion”.
C. Assuming that a valuation is valid for everybody.
D. Assuming that a company has equal value for all buyers.
E. Confusing strategic value for a buyer with fair market value.
F. Considering that the goodwill includes the brand value and the intellectual capital.
G. Forgetting that a valuation is contingent on a set of expectations about cash flow 
generation and about their riskiness.
6. Organizational errors
A. Making a valuation without checking the forecasts given by the client. 
B. Assigning a valuation to an investment bank and not having any involvement in it. 
C.  Involving only the finance department in the valuation of a target company.
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